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INTRODUCTION
Addressing the refugee claims of two gay men1—the first
from Iran, facing the prospect of imprisonment and lashing
under that country’s extreme anti-sodomy laws; the second
from Cameroon, terrorized by his neighbors and assaulted by
police after he was seen kissing his partner—Lord Hope of the
United Kingdom’s new Supreme Court, observed that
a huge gulf has opened up in attitudes to and under-
standing of gay persons between societies . . . . It is
* James E. and Sarah A. Degan Professor of Law and Director, Program
in Refugee and Asylum Law, University of Michigan. The research assistance
of Reta Bezak and the helpful comments of Catherine Dauvergne, Michelle
Foster, Rodger Haines, Raza Husain, Kate Purcell, Hugo Storey, and Ralph
Wilde are acknowledged with appreciation.
** Ph.D. candidate, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge; Hauser
Visiting Doctoral Researcher, New York University School of Law.
1. We refer to the two cases discussed in this article as “queer” cases to
emphasize that these decisions confront the question of assimilationist as-
sumptions in refugee law in a way that echoes the overtly political challenge
of activist groups that embraced the term “queer” as a sign of resistance
against assimilationist politics.  While “queer theory” has since emerged as a
form of critical theory drawing strength from the work of Michel Foucault
(see, for example, EVE K. SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET (1990)
and JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE (1999)), this paper does not seek to
engage the broader question of the validity of heteronormative discourse or
other more theoretical concerns.  Moreover, because the claimants in the
cases under consideration did not themselves seek to challenge assimilation-
ist assumptions (as, perhaps ironically, we believe that the courts did), we
generally refer to them as individuals using more traditional labels such as
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316 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 44:315
one of the most demanding social issues of our time.
Our own government has pledged to do what it can
to resolve the problem, but it seems likely to grow
and to remain with us for many years.  In the
meantime more and more gays and lesbians are likely
to have to seek protection here, as protection is being
denied to them by the state in their home countries.
It is crucially important that they are provided with
the protection that they are entitled to under the
Convention—no more, if I may be permitted to coin
a well-known phrase, but certainly no less.2
There is little doubt that the “huge gulf” referred to by
Lord Hope is in fact an ever-increasing divide between states
of the developed and less developed worlds.3  While not so
long ago institutionalized homophobia was common in devel-
oped countries,4 most of the North has now moved to embrace
2. HJ (Iran) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t (HJ and HT), [2010]
UKSC 31, [3], [2011] 1 A.C. 596, 619–20 (appeal taken from Eng. & Wales
C.A.).
3. This divide was made particularly clear when the Third Committee of
the United Nations General Assembly voted 79-70-17 in favor of a motion by
Benin to delete a call for protection of sexual minorities against extrajudi-
cial, summary, or arbitrary resolutions.  Recorded Vote, U.N. GAOR, Third
Comm., 65th Sess., 46th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/C.3/65/L.65 (Nov. 16, 2010),
available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/third/65/docs/voting_sheets/
L.65.pdf.  The United States and other developed countries spearheaded a
successful drive to reverse this decision, approved on December 21, 2010 by
a vote of 93-55-27: U.N. GAOR, 65th Sess., 71st plen. mtg. at 20, U.N. Doc.
A/65/PV.71 (Dec. 21, 2010).  All OECD countries (other than Turkey,
which did not vote), supported protection for sexual minorities. Id. at 19; see
also Anita Snow, Gay Rights Row Breaks Out over Amended U.N. Resolution, THE
GUARDIAN, Dec. 21, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/21/
gay-rights-row-un-resolution (highlighting that Western nations opposed the
deletion of “sexual orientation” from the list of protected minorities).  Fur-
thermore, the Human Rights Council’s recent resolution on “Human
Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity” affirms the universality of
human rights, and notes concern about violence and discrimination based
on sexual orientation and gender identity.  H.R.C. Res. 17/19, 17th Sess.,
34th mtg., U.N. Doc.A/HRC/17/L/9/Rev.1 (15 June 2011) (passing the res-
olution with a vote of 23-19-3).
4. By the mid-twentieth century homosexual behavior was also seen
as a subversion.  Senator Joseph McCarthy and his homosexual as-
sistant, Roy Cohn, searched out and exposed ‘known homosexuals’
in government service, some of whom lost their jobs while others
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gay rights.  The anti-sodomy laws that existed in nearly a quar-
ter of developed countries as late as the 1980s5 have now all
been eliminated.6  And at the level of affirmative rights, laws
mandating non-discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion in access to employment are in place in nearly all devel-
oped countries,7 with full marriage rights8 now recognized in
Argentina, Belgium, Canada, the Federal District of Mexico,
Iceland, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and
parts of the United States.9
With very few exceptions,10 the same evolution has not
taken place in the political South.  In particular, anti-sodomy
come the target of state-sponsored persecution, homophobia was
an absolutely acceptable prejudice.  By the 1960s, 82 percent of
American men and 58 percent of American women surveyed be-
lieved that only Communists and atheists were more dangerous
than homosexuals.
BYRNE FONE, HOMOPHOBIA: A HISTORY 10 (2000).
5. For example, the following is a list of select countries and the years in
which they decriminalized same-sex sodomy: Portugal (1983); New Zealand
(1986); the United Kingdom (decriminalized in Scotland in 1981 and
Northern Ireland in 1982); Israel (1988); Estonia (1992); Ireland (1993);
Australia (Tasmania was the last state to decriminalize same-sex sodomy in
1997); the United States (decriminalized federally in 2003); Portugal
(2010); Iceland (2010); and Argentina (2010). DANIEL OTTOSSON, INT’L LES-
BIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANS AND INTERSEX ASS’N, STATE-SPONSORED
HOMOPHOBIA: A WORLD SURVEY OF LAWS PROHIBITING SAME SEX ACTIVITY BE-
TWEEN CONSENTING ADULTS 46 (2010), available at http://ilga.org/ilga/en/
article/1161; Timeline: Same-Sex Marriage Around the World, CBC NEWS
(May 29, 2009), http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2009/05/26/f-same-
sex-timeline.html.
6. Id. at 46.
7. As of May 2010, 29 of the 34 OECD Member States expressly prohib-
ited discrimination in employment based on sexual orientation. Id. at 47.
8. Same-sex couples are offered most of the rights of marriage, through
a civil partnership or similar legal classification, in Austria, Denmark, Fin-
land, Germany, Hungary, Israel, New Zealand, Switzerland, the United King-
dom, some states of Australia, and some states of the United States. Id. at 49.
9. Id.  Resistance to the affirmation of gay rights in developed countries
does remain, however, as the Italian Prime Minister has made clear in his
response to allegations of a sex scandal, stating that “[i]t’s better to be pas-
sionate about beautiful women than to be gay.”  Nicole Winefield, Berlusconi:
Better to Love Women than Gays, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2010, http://
www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/nov/2/berlusconi-better-love-wo-
men-gays/.
10. Just as the Northern record of support for gay equality is not uni-
form, neither is it the case that the record of less developed states is uni-
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and similar laws remain in place in seventy-four less developed
countries, and are regularly enforced in many of them.11  It
should therefore come as no surprise that members of sexual
minorities in flight from both police and other state agents, as
well as from vigilante and other private actors taking their cue
from legislated homophobia, have increasingly sought the pro-
tection of Northern states that take a more sympathetic view of
gay rights.  Until and unless the rights of sexual minorities are
comparably ensured in most Southern countries, Northern
states can expect to receive asylum claims from those at risk,
requiring them to strike precisely the balance posited by Lord
Hope.
The Refugee Convention,12 now adopted by 147 states,13
is the primary instrument governing refugee status under in-
ternational law.  The Convention sets a binding and non-
amendable definition of which persons are entitled to recogni-
tion as refugees, and thus to enjoy the surrogate or substitute
national protection of an asylum state.  The core of the article
countries in the world that recognizes same-sex marriages. Minister of Home
Affairs v. Fourie 2006 (1) SA 424 (CC).  Nepal has announced its intention to
do the same. Nepal to Celebrate Becoming First Asian Nation to Recognise Gay
Marriages with Same-Sex Unions on Mount Everest, DAILY MAIL, Apr. 21, 2010,
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1267713/Nepal-celebrate-Asian-
nation-recognise-gay-marriages-sex-unions-Mount-Everest.html.
11. “In 38 countries across the continent of Africa, same-sex activity is
criminalized and one has only to look at the reports of human rights organi-
zations to see evidence of the violence and discrimination unleashed on
LGBT people because of their sexual orientation or gender identity.” INT’L
GAY AND LESBIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, NOWHERE TO TURN: BLACKMAIL
AND EXTORTION OF LGBT PEOPLE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 5 (Ryan Thoreson
& Sam Cook, eds. 2011).  For country specific examples, see HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, “THEY WANT US EXTERMINATED”: MURDER, TORTURE, SEXUAL ORIEN-
TATION AND GENDER IN IRAQ (2009); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CRIMINALIZING
IDENTITIES: RIGHTS ABUSES IN CAMEROON BASED ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND
GENDER IDENTITY (2010); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FEAR FOR LIFE: VIOLENCE
AGAINST GAY MEN AND MEN PERCEIVED TO BE GAY IN SENEGAL (2010).
12. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July
28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 139 [hereinafter Convention or Refugee Conven-
tion]. The temporal and geographic reach of the Convention is extended by
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967,
19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter Protocol].
13. There are 147 state parties to either the Convention or the Protocol.
Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, States Parties to the 1951
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol, http://
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1A(2) definition provides that a refugee is a person who has a
“well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, re-
ligion, nationality, political opinion, or membership of a par-
ticular social group.”  A person is thus a refugee, and entitled
to the non-refoulement and other protections of the Refugee
Convention, only if there is a risk of the applicant “being per-
secuted,” meaning that a form of serious harm is threatened
which bespeaks a failure of state protection.  Moreover, that
risk of being persecuted must be causally connected to one of
the five enumerated forms of civil or political status.  It must
also be “well-founded” in the sense that there is a real chance
that the risk of being persecuted for a Convention reason will,
in fact, accrue if the applicant is sent home.14
In most respects, the Refugee Convention has effectively
accommodated claims based on sexual orientation.15
A gay claimant will only be a refugee if he apprehends a
form of harm that amounts to a risk of “being persecuted.”
The Convention’s use of the passive voice “being persecuted,”
rather than simply “persecution,” signals the need to demon-
14. The individual must also be outside their country of origin and be in
need of and deserving of protection.  Convention, supra note 12, arts. R
1(A)(2), 1(D)–1(F).  These elements of the definition have been largely
non-contentious in the context of sexual orientation claims.
15. Our article is focused on refugee law doctrine.  We note, however,
the difficulties that a gay claimant might have in establishing questions of
fact (for example, that they in fact are gay).  While we acknowledge the valid
concerns raised by states in the context of sexual orientation refugee claims
(for example, the difficulties in assessing sexuality; the potential for abuse),
these are, at the end of the day, part and parcel of the refugee law system.
Like every other case, these concerns must be addressed by recourse to rules
of evidence and procedure. Cf. Paul Canning, Czech Republic Uses ‘Gay Tests’
on Asylum Seekers, PINK NEWS (Dec. 6, 2010, 3:13 PM), http://www.pinknews.
co.uk/2010/12/06/czech-republic-uses-gay-tests-on-asylum-seekers (describ-
ing  the Czech Republic’s use of “phallometric testing” to determine if asy-
lum seekers are truly gay).  For a comprehensive analysis of some of the evi-
dential obstacles faced by sexual minority applicants, see Catherine
Dauvergne & Jenni Millbank, Burdened by Proof: How the Australian Refugee
Review Tribunal Has Failed Lesbian and Gay Asylum Seekers, 31 FED. L. REV. 299
(2003) [hereinafter Dauvergne & Millbank, Burdened by Proof]; Catherine
Dauvergne & Jenni Millbank, Before the High Court: Applicants S396/2002 and
S395/2002, a Gay Refugee Couple from Bangladesh, 25 SYDNEY L. REV. 97 (2003)
[hereinafter Dauvergne & Millbank, Before the High Court]; Jenni Millbank,
From Discretion to Disbelief: Recent Trends in Refugee Determinations on the Basis of
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strate a predicament of risk that cannot or will not be depend-
ably rectified by the applicant’s own country.  As the Austra-
lian Federal Court held in Kord,16 the “use of the passive voice
conveys a compound notion, concerned both with the con-
duct of the persecutor and the effect that conduct has on the
person being persecuted.”17  That is, because the Convention
is concerned with protection against a condition or predica-
ment—being persecuted—consideration must be given to both
the nature of the risk and the nature of the state response (if
any), since it is the combination of the two that gives rise to
the predicament of “being persecuted.”  As senior courts have
agreed, it is therefore necessary to show the “sustained or sys-
temic violation of basic human rights demonstrative of a fail-
ure of state protection.”18
Because the range of harms inflicted by reason of sexual
orientation is far too often at the most brutal end of the
16. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v Kord
(2002) 125 FCR 68 (Austl.).
17. Id. [2].
18. JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 112 (1991).  This
bifurcated approach was first endorsed by the Supreme Court of Canada in
Canada (Att’y Gen.) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 723–724.  It has since
been formally embraced by the United Kingdom’s House of Lords, and
since 2009, its Supreme Court in a series of cases.  Islam v. Sec’y of State for
the Home Dep’t (Shah), [1999] UKHL 20, [1999] 2 A.C. 629, 643 (Lord
Steyn) (appeal taken from Eng. & Wales C.A.); Horvath v. Sec’y of State for
the Home Dep’t, [2000] UKHL 37, [2001] 1 A.C. 489, 495 (Lord Hope of
Craighead), 512 (Lord Clyde) (appeal taken from Eng. & Wales C.A.); Sepet
v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2003] UKHL 15, [7], [2003] 1 W.L.R.
856, 862–63  (Lord Bingham of Cornhill) (appeal taken from Eng. & Wales
C.A.); R. v. Special Adjudicator (Ullah), [2004] UKHL 26, [32], [2004] 2
A.C. 323, 355 (Lord Steyn) (appeal taken from Eng. & Wales C.A.); HJ
(Iran) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t (HJ and HT), [2010] UKSC 31,
[2011] 1 A.C. 596, 609 (Lord Hope) (appeal taken from Eng. & Wales C.A.).
Although not yet uniformly embraced in Australia, this approach was also
endorsed expressly by Justice Kirby and implicitly by Chief Justice Gleeson of
the Australian High Court in Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v
Khawar [2002] 210 CLR 1, [70], [111].  Although the United States ap-
proach to the interpretation of “being persecuted” is not grounded in any
particular framework, in a 2007 decision the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit stated: “Whether the treatment feared by a claimant violates
recognized standards of basic human rights can determine whether persecu-
tion exists.”  Stenaj v. Gonzalez, 227 F. App’x 429, 433 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing
JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 104–05 (1991); Abay v.
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human rights spectrum—arbitrary arrest and imprisonment,19
kidnapping,20 police beatings,21 public lashing and stoning,22
rape,23 involuntary medical intervention,24 “social cleans-
ing,”25 and even state-sanctioned execution26—it has not been
difficult for courts to see the prospective harms facing many
gay refugee claimants27 as sufficiently serious to satisfy the “se-
rious harm” limb of the “being persecuted” inquiry.  Less vio-
lent and even more common responses to homosexuality—for
example, denial of the right to work, education, medical treat-
ment, or public housing—have also been appropriately recog-
19. A Human Rights Watch Report quotes a victim of arbitrary arrest and
imprisonment in Cameroon thus:
Two men with SWAT [Special Weapons and Tactics] team
uniforms barged into my house. . . . I asked why they were arresting
me. . . . [T]hey said I was there for homosexuality and pushed me
into a cell.  I shared the cell with four other men.  Police told me
they were also there because they were faggots.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CRIMINALIZING IDENTITIES: RIGHTS ABUSES IN CAME-
ROON BASED ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY 16 (2010).
20. Shaun Walker, Russian Gay Rights Activist ‘Kidnapped by Police at Air-
port,’ THE INDEPENDENT, Sept. 21, 2010, at 22.
21. Policı́as agredieron a gays que se besaban en el Centro de Lima [Police As-
sault Gays Kissing in the Center of Lima], EL COMERCIO (Feb. 13, 2011),
http://elcomercio.pe/lima/713170/noticia-policias-agredieron-gays-que-se-
besaban-centro-lima.
22. Paul Canning, Iranian Men to Be Stoned to Death over Gay Sex, PINK
NEWS (Jan. 18, 2011), http://www.pinknews.co.uk/2011/01/18/iranian-
men-to-be-stoned-to-death-over-gay-sex.
23. Annie Kelly, Raped and Killed for Being a Lesbian: South Africa Ignores
‘Corrective’ Attacks, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 12, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.
uk/world/2009/mar/12/eudy-simelane-corrective-rape-south-africa.
24. Ryan Goodman, The Incorporation of International Human Rights Stan-
dards into Sexual Orientation Asylum Claims: Cases of Involuntary ‘Medical’ Inter-
vention, 105 YALE L.J. 255 (1995).
25. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “THEY WANT US EXTERMINATED”: MURDER,
TORTURE, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IN IRAQ 2 (2009).
26. Iran, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Yemen, plus some parts of
Somalia and Nigeria, presently maintain the death penalty for homosexual
conduct. OTTOSSON, supra note 5, at 45. R
27. We acknowledge that terminology here is difficult and the subject of
personal preference.  We have generally used the terms “sexual minority” or
“gay” as convenient shorthand to refer to gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender,
and intersex persons.  Pronouns are phrased in the masculine voice in rec-
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322 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 44:315
nized as persecutory harms28 in line with the more general
evolution of refugee law to predicate such a finding on the
existence of a risk to core, internationally recognized human
rights.29
Nor has it been a challenge to satisfy the second half of
the “being persecuted” inquiry, which requires a showing ei-
ther that the state is itself the agent of harm, or alternatively
that it is unable or unwilling effectively to counter threats ema-
nating from non-state agents.  Some forty percent of the
world’s nations still criminalize homosexual acts,30 with a num-
ber of regimes still striving to make their laws and enforce-
ment regimes even more repressive.31  Where sexual minori-
ties are threatened by non-state actors, gay applicants have
benefitted from the recognition that the absence of a mean-
28. See Kadri v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 16, 21–22 (1st  Cir. 2008) (finding that
a gay applicant might be eligible for refugee status on the basis that he
would be unable to earn a living as a medical doctor if he returned to Indo-
nesia). See generally MICHELLE FOSTER, INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW AND
SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS: REFUGE FROM DEPRIVATION 156–235 (2007).  It
must be noted that despite substantial advances in international refugee ju-
risprudence in the recognition of socio-economic persecution, some deci-
sion makers have been reluctant to recognize violations of these rights as a
form of harm in sexual orientation cases. See Paredes v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 219
F. App’x 879, 887 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding that the situation of HIV-in-
fected homosexual men left without medical treatment in their home coun-
try was “regrettable” but did not rise to the level of persecution necessary for
the grant of asylum).  Similarly, an Australian Court found that familial re-
jection could not amount to being persecuted, even where that could lead to
“utter penury,” noting that the applicant “might at worst starve.” MMM v
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1998) 90 FCR 324, 326–27
(Austl.) (emphasis added).
29. See supra note 18. R
30. OTTOSSON, supra note 5, at 45; see also Gay Rights in Developing Coun- R
tries: A Well-Locked Closet, THE ECONOMIST (May 27, 2010), http://www.econo-
mist.com/node/16219402 (describing the discrimination gays face in devel-
oping countries).
31. For example, see Uganda’s Anti-Homosexuality Bill, introduced into
parliament on October 13, 2009, proposing, amongst other things, to intro-
duce the death penalty for people with previous convictions, who are HIV-
positive, or who engage in same sex acts with people under 18 years of age.
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ingful state response to the non-state threat is what is required
to justify asylum.32
The Refugee Convention’s nexus criterion—that is, the
requirement that the risk of being persecuted must be “for rea-
sons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion”—is also rarely a bar to the
recognition of gay claims.33  At least since the landmark deci-
sion of the Supreme Court of Canada in Ward, which drew on
non-discrimination norms to recognize “gender, linguistic
background and sexual orientation” as the paradigmatic exam-
32. [I]n the context of an allegation of persecution by non-state
agents, the word “persecution” implies a failure by the state to
make protection available against the ill-treatment or violence
which the person suffers at the hands of the persecutors.  In a case
where the allegation is of persecution by the state or its own agents
the problem does not, of course, arise.  This is a clear case for the
surrogate protection by the international community.  But in the
case of an allegation of persecution by non-state agents, the failure
to provide the protection is nevertheless an essential element.  It
provides the bridge between persecution by the state and persecu-
tion by non-state agents which is necessary in the interest of the
consistency of the whole scheme.
Horvath v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2000] UKHL 37, [2001] 1
A.C. 489, 497 (Lord Hope) (appeal taken from Eng. & Wales C.A.).
33. We note, however, that this very question was recently slated for con-
sideration by the European Court of Justice, after the German Administra-
tive Court considered the question of whether “homosexuality is to be con-
sidered a sexual orientation within the meaning of the second sentence of
Article 10(1)(d) of [Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on Min-
imum Standards for the Qualification and Status of Third Country Nationals
or Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons Who Otherwise Need Interna-
tional Protection and the Content of the Protection Granted, 2004 O.J. (L
304) 13 (EU) [hereinafter EU Qualification Directive], available at http://
www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4157e75e4.html].”  Reference for a Prelim-
inary Ruling from the Oberverwaltungsgericht fuer das Land Nordrhein-
Westfalen Lodged on 1 December 2010–Kashayar Khavand v Ger., 2011 O.J.
(C38) 7.  If answered in the affirmative, the Administrative Court raised
three additional questions: “(a) To what extent is homosexual activity pro-
tected?; (b) Can a homosexual person be told to live with his or her sexual
orientation in his or her home country in secret and not allow it to become
known to others?; (c) Are specific prohibitions for the protection of public
order and morals relevant when interpreting and applying Article 10(1)(d)
of [the EU Qualification Directive] or should homosexual activity be pro-
tected in the same way as for heterosexual people?” Id.  The reference was
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ples of particular social groups,34 the members of sexual mi-
norities have had little difficulty bringing themselves within
the scope of the Convention’s beneficiary class.35  And in line
with the understanding that the Convention ground need not
be the sole, or even the dominant, cause of the risk of being
persecuted, a gay applicant will satisfy the nexus requirement
so long as their sexual identity is a contributing element in the
production of the risk.36
Despite these positive developments, refugee protection
has often been denied to gay applicants over the past decade,
34. Canada (Att’y Gen.) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 739 (emphasis ad-
ded).  This approach was approved in Shah:
In 1951 the draftsmen of article 1A(2) of the Convention explicitly
listed the most apparent forms of discrimination then known,
namely the large groups covered by race, religion, and political
opinion. It would have been remarkable if the draftsmen had over-
looked other forms of discrimination.  After all, in 1948 the Univer-
sal Declaration had condemned discrimination on the grounds of
colour and sex.  Accordingly, the draftsmen of the Convention pro-
vided that membership of a particular social group would be a fur-
ther category.
Islam v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t (Shah), [1999] UKHL 20, [1999]
2 A.C. 629, 643 (appeal taken from Eng. & Wales C.A.); see also HATHAWAY,
supra note 18, at 136. R
35. See In re Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 822 (B.I.A. 1990) (re-
jecting as unpersuasive the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s argu-
ment that the homosexual asylum seeker was not part of a “particular social
group” in Cuba); Refugee Appeal No. 1312/93 (Re GJ) [1998] INLR 387 (N.Z.)
(applying the norms approach in Ward to find “the issue of sexual orienta-
tion presents little difficulty” in qualifying as a “particular social group”
under the Convention); Shah, [1999] UKHL 20, 2 A.C. at 644–45 (Lord
Steyn), 663 (Lord Millett) (U.K.) (using homosexual individuals as a para-
digmatic class of protected individuals under the Convention for purposes of
comparison to other classes); Decision of 13 May 2002 (Refugee Appeal
Board 2002), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4b0e98fc2.
pdf (S. Afr.) (accepting Shah’s finding that homosexuals formed a “particu-
lar social group” under the Convention); EU Qualification Directive, supra
note 33, art. 10(1)(d) (directly mentioning “sexual orientation” as a basis for R
forming a “particular social group”).  In 1994, the U.S. Attorney General
designated Toboso-Alfonso “as precedent in all proceedings involving the same
issue or issues.”  Att’y Gen. Order No. 1895-94 (June 19, 1994).
36. Cf. Zhou v. Ashcroft, 85 F. App’x 566, 568 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating
that the asylum statute covers persecution where the “protected ground”
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particularly in Australia and the United Kingdom,37 on the
grounds that the “well-founded fear” criterion of the refugee
definition is not met where a member of a sexual minority can
reasonably be expected “to be discreet” or otherwise “tolerate”
a measure of internalized repression in order to avoid the risk
of being persecuted in their home state.  Because sexual mi-
nority status—like the protected grounds of political opinion
and religion (and, to a lesser extent, race and nationality)—
can be concealed or repressed, it has been asserted by some
courts that there is therefore a duty to conceal one’s sexual
orientation in order to avert the prospect of being perse-
cuted.38  The tragedy is that courts advanced this obligation of
behavior modification, in effect “postulating self-censor-
ship,”39 against gay applicants even as they vigorously (and ap-
propriately) rejected any comparable duty to disguise one’s
political opinions or religious convictions in order to be safe.40
37. Compare to the approach adopted in Canada in XMU (Re), [1995]
C.R.D.D. 146, No. T94-06899 (Immigration and Refugee Board of Can.); in
the U.S. in Karouni v.Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163, 1170 (9th Cir. 2005) and Her-
nandez-Montiel v. I.N.S., 225 F.3d 1084, 1099 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other
grounds by Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177, 1187 (9th Cir. 2005); and in
New Zealand in Re GJ [1998] INLR 387.  In each of these cases the court
disavowed any attempt to impose a “duty of discretion,” but did not go on to
consider the additional question of whether an applicant who would in fact
be “discreet” could qualify for Convention refugee status.  This was the criti-
cal issue in the cases under consideration here. See infra text accompanying
note 59.  A recent report prepared by S. Jansen and T. Spijkerboer suggests R
that “discretion reasoning,” in various guises, still occurs in a number of civil
jurisdictions, including Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania,
Spain, Norway, and Switzerland. SABINE JANSEN &THOMAS SPIJKERBOER, FLEE-
ING HOMOPHOBIA: ASYLUM CLAIMS RELATED TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND
GENDER IDENTITY IN EUROPE 33–39 (2011).
38. An overview of this foundational jurisprudence is provided in
Dauvergne & Millbank, Before the High Court, supra note 15. R
39. Applicant NABD of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural &
Indigenous Affairs (Applicant NABD) (2005) 216 ALR 1, [138] (Kirby J)
(Austl.).
40. [I]n all asylum cases there is ultimately but a single question to
be asked: is there a serious risk that on return the applicant would
be persecuted for a Convention reason?  If there is, then he is enti-
tled to asylum.  It matters not whether the risk arises from his own
conduct in this country, however unreasonable . . . . It is one thing
to say . . . that may well be reasonable to require asylum seekers to
refrain from certain political or even religious activities to avoid
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The very notion of a duty to be “discreet” about one’s pro-
tected identity is, moreover, inherently problematic.  As Lord
Hope pointedly observed, it is more accurate to speak of an
expectation of “concealment”41:
I would prefer not to use the word “discretion,” as
this euphemistic expression does not tell the whole
truth . . . . Behaviour which reveals one’s sexual ori-
entation, whether one is gay or straight, varies from
individual to individual.  It occupies a wide spectrum,
from people who are naturally reticent and have no
particular desire to establish a sexual relationship
with anybody to those who wish, for various reasons,
to proclaim in public their sexual identity.42
Indeed, the assumption that it is in fact possible for every gay
applicant to be discreet—that there is, in effect, some univer-
sal on/off switch—is empirically unsound.  As Dauvergne and
Millbank have observed, “[t]he question of being ‘out’ is never
answered once and for all, it is a decision made over and over,
each day and in each new social situation . . . . [T]he state of
‘closeted-ness’ [is] always a potentially permeable one.”43
This sui generis imposition of a “duty to be discreet”
against gay applicants has now been expressly rejected on two
separate occasions by ultimate appellate courts.  In the deci-
sion of Appellant S395/2002 and S396/2002 v Minister of Immi-
gration & Multicultural Affairs,44 the High Court of Australia
fact it appears that the asylum seeker on return would not refrain
from such activities—if, in other words, it is established that he
would in fact act unreasonably—he is not entitled to refugee status.
Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t v. Ahmed, [1999] EWCA (Civ) 3003,
[2000] INLR 1 (appeal taken from Asylum & Immigr. Trib.) (U.K.); see also
Hysi v. Sec’y State for the Home Dep’t, [2005] EWCA (Civ) 711, [15], [2005]
INLR 602 (appeal taken from Immigr. Appeal Trib.) (U.K.) (“To compel an
individual to disown his origins interferes with a fundamental right.  If the
consequence of exercising the right to declare your race would lead others
to subject you to severe ill-treatment, the consequence would be discrimina-
tion on the grounds of race, and persecution.”).
41. HJ (Iran) v Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t (HJ and HT), [2010]
UKSC 31, [22], [2011] 1 A.C. 596, 625 (appeal taken from Eng. & Wales
C.A.).  We have adopted the latter language throughout this article.
42. Id.
43. Dauvergne & Millbank, Before the High Court, supra note 15, at 122. R
44. Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs
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noted the dissonance between the treatment of gay and other
refugee claimants, and determined that
it is no answer to a claim for protection as a refugee
to say to an applicant that those adverse conse-
quences could be avoided if the applicant were to
hide the fact that he or she holds the beliefs in ques-
tion.  And to say to an applicant that he or she should
be “discreet” about such matters is simply to use gen-
tler terms to convey the same meaning.45
The High Court determined that no duty could be imposed
on a gay applicant to modify his conduct in order to avoid the
risk of being persecuted.46  In the Court’s view, the capacity of
an individual to avoid persecutory harm is irrelevant to
whether or not the applicant faces a real chance of being per-
secuted.47  Justices Kirby and McHugh found that “persecution
does not cease to be persecution for the purpose of the Con-
vention because those persecuted can eliminate the harm by
taking avoiding action within the country of nationality.”48
The point was also forcefully put by Justices Gummow and
Hayne:
Saying that an applicant for protection would live
“discreetly” in the country of nationality may be an
accurate description of the way in which that person
would go about his or her daily life.  To say that a
decision-maker “expects” that that person will live dis-
creetly may also be accurate if it is read as a statement
of what is thought likely to happen.  But to say that
an applicant for protection is “expected” to live dis-
creetly is both wrong and irrelevant to the task to be
45. Id. at 500 (Gummow & Hayne JJ). See generally Dauvergne &
Millbank, Before the High Court, supra note 15; Christopher N. Kendall, Lesbian R
and Gay Refugees in Australia: Now that ‘Acting Discreetly’ Is no Longer an Option,
Will Equality Be Forthcoming? 15 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 715 (2003); Millbank,
supra note 15. R
46. “In so far as decisions in the Tribunal and the Federal Court contain
statements that asylum seekers are required, or can be expected, to take rea-
sonable steps to avoid persecutory harm, they are wrong in principle and
should not be followed.” S395 (2003) 216 CLR at 492 (McHugh & Kirby JJ).
47. Id. at 491–92 .
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undertaken by the Tribunal if it is indeed as a state-
ment of what the applicant must do.49
The Court determined that any other interpretation would un-
dermine the very object of the Convention.50
Drawing on this precedent, the United Kingdom’s Su-
preme Court held more recently in HJ (Iran) v. Secretary of State
for the Home Department 51 that “what is protected is the appli-
cant’s right to live freely and openly as a gay man. . . . [G]ay
men are to be as free as their straight equivalents in the society
concerned to live their lives in the way that is natural to them
as gay men, without the fear of persecution.”52  The Supreme
Court stressed that no duty can be imposed on an applicant to
modify his behavior in order to avoid a risk of being perse-
cuted:
The underlying rationale of the Convention is . . .
that people should be able to live freely, without fear-
ing that they may suffer harm of the requisite inten-
sity or duration because they are, say, black, or the
descendants of some former dictator, or gay.  In the
absence of any indication to the contrary, the impli-
cation is that they must be free to live openly in this
way without fear of persecution.  By allowing them to
live openly and free from that fear, the receiving state
affords them protection which is a surrogate for the
49. Id. at 501.
50. The Convention would give no protection from persecution for
reasons of religion or political opinion if it was a condition of pro-
tection that the person affected must take steps—reasonable or
otherwise—to avoid offending the wishes of the persecutors.  Nor
would it give protection to membership of many a “particular social
group” if it were a condition of protection that its members hide
their membership or modify some attribute or characteristic of the
group to avoid persecution.  Similarly, it would often fail to give
protection to people who are persecuted for reasons of race or na-
tionality if it was a condition of protection that they should take
steps to conceal their race or nationality . . . . It would undermine
the object of the Convention if the signatory countries required
them to modify their beliefs or opinions or to hide their race, na-
tionality or membership of particular social groups before those
countries would give them protection under the Convention.
Id. [40]–[41] (McHugh & Kirby JJ).
51. HJ (Iran) v Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t (HJ and HT), [2010]
UKSC 31, [2011] 1 A.C. 596, (appeal taken from Eng. & Wales C.A.).
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protection which their home state should have af-
forded them.53
In the Court’s view, a claimant is entitled to the protection of
the Convention irrespective of the fact that “he could avoid
suffering any actual harm by modifying his behavior (say, by
conducting himself ‘discreetly’) on his return to his home
state but would not in fact choose to do so.”54
Each of these decisions has been justifiably regarded as
cause for celebration.  By explicitly rejecting the proposition
that the refugee claim of a gay applicant can be denied on the
grounds of failure to avoid risk through concealment of iden-
tity or behavioral modification,55 the top courts in Australia
and the United Kingdom have moved firmly to align access to
refugee status for sexual minorities with the norms applicable
to other claimant groups.56  By so doing, they have reinforced
53. Id. [53], [2011] 1 A.C. at 637–38 (Lord Rodger).
54. Id. [54], [2011] 1 A.C. at 638; see also id. [18], [2011] 1 A.C. at 638
(Lord Hope) (“[T]he fact that [the refugee] could take action to avoid per-
secution does not disentitle him from asylum if in fact he will not act in such
a way as to avoid it.”).
55. We have some concerns that the United Kingdom Supreme Court
allowed through the back door the very duty to conceal sexual identity it had
so firmly refused to allow through the front door.  On one interpretation the
Court appears to have legitimized a “de facto” duty of discretion by finding
that “when faced with a real threat of persecution, the applicant would have
no choice: he would be compelled to act discreetly.” Id. [59], [2011] 1 A.C.
at 639.  As elaborated by Sir John Dyson, this position amounts to a general
rule: “Most asylum-seekers will opt for the life of discretion in preference to
persecution.  This is no real choice. If they are returned, they will, in effect,
be required to act discreetly.” Id. [123], [2011] 1 A.C. at 630.  As such, the
Court appears to have determined that self-repression will be assumed in
every case where a gay applicant is, absent concealment, at risk of physical
harm in his home country.  This is precisely what Justice Kirby warned
against in his decision in Applicant NABD:
Having accepted that a “quiet” (equivalent to “discreet”) practice of
religious beliefs was imperative for safety in Iran, the second Tribu-
nal effectively imposed the requirement of ‘quiet sharing of one’s
faith’ on the appellant, were he to be returned to Iran.  Its predic-
tion of what he would do was necessarily dependent upon its assess-
ment of what alone it would be safe for him to do in Iran.
Applicant NABD of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indige-
nous Affairs (Applicant NABD) (2005) 216 ALR 1, [106] (Austl.).
56. The dissonance of the earlier position with cases involving other Con-
vention grounds was noted repeatedly in both S395 and HJ and HT.  For
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the capacity of the Refugee Convention to “enable the person
who no longer has the benefit of protection against persecu-
tion in his home country to turn for protection to the interna-
tional community,”57 to benefit from the international “back-
up to the protection one expects from the State of which an
individual is a national.”58
In truth, however, the courts’ rejection of the gay-specific
“duty to be discreet” was obiter dicta.  Based on the facts
found,59 the applicants in S395 and HJ and HT would not be
“out” in their home state, and therefore the question of impos-
ing a duty of concealment did not arise.  Both cases actually
involved the far more common scenario in which a gay appli-
cant would opt to modify his conduct to avoid the risk of being
persecuted because to do so would be eminently rational in
the circumstances.60  In recognizing refugee status even where
If an applicant holds political or religious beliefs that are not
favoured in the country of nationality, the chance of adverse conse-
quences befalling that applicant on return to that country would
ordinarily increase if, on return, the applicant were to draw atten-
tion to the holding of the relevant belief.  But it is no answer to a
claim for protection as a refugee to say to an applicant that those
adverse consequences could be avoided if the applicant were to
hide the fact that he or she holds the beliefs in question.
Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous
Affairs (S395) (2003) 216 CLR 473, 500 (Austl.).
57. Horvath v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2000] UKHL 37,
[2001] 1 A.C. 489, 495 (appeal taken from Eng. & Wales C.A.).
58. Canada (Att’y Gen.) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 709.
59. There may be reasons to doubt the factual findings made by the
lower-level tribunals in the case of HJ and HT.  We return to this at note 96 R
infra.
60. In S395, the Court adopted the Minister’s submission that the Tribu-
nal imposed no duty on the claimants, but rather found that the applicants
would live discreetly in the future, as they had done in the past, because
“there is no reason to suppose that they would not continue to do so if they
returned home now.” S395 (2003) 216 CLR at 481; see also id. at 487 (Kirby &
McHugh JJ) (“In our view, these contentions of the Minister are correct”);
id. at 502 (Gummow & Hayne JJ) (“The better view is that that sentence
records the Tribunal’s conclusion about what the appellants were likely to
do if they did return to Bangladesh”); id. at 481 (Gleeson CJ) (“When that
passage is considered in the context of the claim advanced by the appellants,
their evidence, the Tribunal’s evaluation of the evidence, and the reasons
given for rejecting that evidence, it is clear that the Tribunal was neither
counselling nor requiring discretion on the part of the appellants.”).  Simi-
larly, in HJ and HT, the Secretary of State from the outset accepted that no
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risk would be averted by concealment, the Australian and Brit-
ish courts departed in critical ways from accepted refugee law
doctrine.
The determination that none of the applicants would face
the real risk of physical abuse—because they understandably
decided that disguising their sexual identity and avoiding con-
duct associated with their sexuality was the safest course of ac-
tion—raises a crucial challenge to satisfaction of the Conven-
tion’s “well-founded fear” requirement.  Only persons able to
show a forward-looking risk of persecutory harm can establish
a “well-founded fear,” and hence qualify as refugees.  But if
prudence means that the risk would, in fact, never accrue, how
can the fear of being persecuted be said to be “well-founded”
in objective terms?  This conundrum was pointed out by Sir
John Dyson in HJ and HT:
How can a gay man, who would have a well-founded
fear of persecution if he were to live openly as a gay
man on return to his country, be said to have a well-
founded fear of persecution if on return he would in
fact live discreetly, thereby probably escaping the at-
tention of those who might harm him if they were
aware of his sexual orientation? . . . [I]t might be
thought that this should lead to the conclusion that,
if a gay man would live discreetly on return and
thereby avoid being harmed or persecuted on ac-
count of his sexual orientation, he could not have a
well-founded fear of persecution within the meaning
of article 1(A)(2) of the Convention.61
Both the High Court of Australia and Supreme Court of
the United Kingdom rightly took umbrage at the unsavory im-
plications of this analysis: effectively, a duty to grant refugee
status to the openly gay claimant even as it was denied to a
comparably situated but more cautious applicant.  But in their
for the Home Dep’t (HJ and HT), [2010] UKSC 31, [54], [2011] 1 A.C. 596,
638 (Lord Rodger); id. [18], [2011] 1 A.C. at 623–24 (Lord Hope); see also
Case for the Respondent, [4], HJ and HT, [2010] UKSC 31, [2011] 1 A.C.
596 (on file with authors) (“It is accepted that applicants may not be refused
asylum on the basis that they ‘could’ or ‘should’ or ‘are expected to’ or ‘are
required to’ behave discreetly in order to avoid persecution.  The issue is
always to determine how they will behave upon return and whether on that
basis there is a real risk of persecution.”).
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determination to ensure that the “well-founded fear” require-
ment was not a bar to the rationally motivated gay applicant,62
the two courts ran roughshod over their responsibility to iden-
tify the risk of persecutory harm that the claimants in S395 and
HJ and HT would in fact face by virtue of their entirely under-
standable63 preference for concealment over persecution.
Specifically, the forms of harm on which the courts fo-
cused their attention—“physical abuse, discrimination in em-
ployment, expulsion from their communities or violence or
blackmail at the hands of police and others,”64 or the arbitrary
and brutal enforcement of anti-sodomy laws65—were precisely
the harms that the courts determined would not eventuate be-
cause of the claimants’ “discretion.”  Yet, if there is no real
chance, no serious possibility that the claimants in S395 would
be subjected to violence or blackmail or that the applicants in
62. Following the decision in Appellant S395, it is necessary to rid this
area of decisional discourse of the supposed dichotomy between
applicants for protection visas who might be able to avoid or dimin-
ish the risks of persecution by conducting themselves ‘discreetly’ in
denial of their fundamental human rights and those who assert
those rights or who might deliberately or even accidentally mani-
fest them, or be thought or alleged to have done so.  The most
effective way that this Court can ensure that this untextual, irrele-
vant and undesirable dichotomy is deleted from refugee decisions
in Australia is by the insistence that, where it surfaces, the outcome
is set aside and the matter remitted for reconsideration, freedom
from error.
Applicant NABD of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indige-
nous Affairs (Applicant NABD) (2005) 216 ALR 1, [143] (Austl.).  Justice Kirby
considered that “[a] person successfully hiding from his persecution can
scarcely be said to be experiencing no problems.  Such a finding is per-
verse.” Id. [132] (citing Sabaratnam v. Can. (Minister of Emp’t & Immigra-
tion), 1992 CarswellNat 1182, [4] (Can. C.A.) (WL)).
63. It is not fatal to such a claim of persecution that the claimant
fails to show that he or she is a leading exponent of a claim to, or
the wish to, exercise such rights, let alone that he or she exhibits a
capacity for martyrdom.  The Convention aims at the protection of
those whose human dignity is imperiled, the timorous as well as the
bold, the inarticulate as well as the outspoken, the followers as well
as the leaders in religious, political or social causes, in a word, the
ordinary person as well as the extraordinary one.
Win v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs, [2001] FCA 132, [20]
(Austl.).
64. S395 (2003) 216 CLR at 493 (McHugh & Kirby JJ).
65. HJ and HT, [2010] UKSC 31, [37], [2011] 1 A.C. at 631 (Lord Hope)
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HJ (Iran) would face imprisonment or lashing, then each
court’s analysis failed to identify a risk of some form of serious
harm that can be said to be “well-founded.”  In our view, the
Australian and British courts were correct to find that the gay
claimant who avoids physical or other serious harm by conceal-
ing his identity or desisting from associated conduct nonethe-
less faces a risk of being persecuted.  But what the decisions
should have said is that it is the modification of behavior itself,
or the impact that the modification has on the applicant, that
is the relevant persecutory harm.66  These cases present clear
examples of a genuine risk of non-physical persecutory
harms—which we refer to here as endogenous harms—as con-
trasted with more classic exogenous harms.
In addition to failing to identify the persecutory harm for
which there is a “well-founded fear,” the two courts also pos-
ited an extraordinarily broad definition of risk “for reasons of”
sexual orientation.  While risk that follows from actual or im-
puted sexual identity is readily encompassed by the non-dis-
crimination norm that informs the nexus requirement,67 more
nuance is required to identify the circumstances in which pro-
tection is owed where risk follows from actions rather than
from identity per se.  In that context, for example, some politi-
cally motivated actions, such as treason or sedition, may not be
protected because they encroach on the rights of others.68
And in the context of religion, some religiously motivated ac-
tions—for example, refusal to pay taxes that support a war op-
66. With one potential exception in S395 (2003) 216 CLR at 490 (Mc-
Hugh & Kirby JJ). See infra text accompanying note 122. R
67. See infra text accompanying notes 224–231. R
68. The Human Rights Committee has explicitly addressed the scope of
permissible limitations in its interpretation of the right to freedom of relig-
ion and political opinion, providing decision makers with a principled lit-
mus test for identifying activities appropriately subject to restraint. E.g., U.N.
Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 22: The Right to Freedom of
Thought, Conscience and Religion (Art. 18), ¶¶ 7–8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/
21/Rev.1/Add.4 (July 30, 1993); U.N. Human Rights Comm., CCPR General
Comment No. 10: Freedom of Expression (1983), in Compilation of General
Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights
Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7, at 133 (May 12, 2004) [here-
inafter Compilation of General Comments]; U.N. Human Rights Comm.,
General Comment No. 34: Article 19: Freedoms of Opinion and Expression,
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posed on religious grounds69—have been found not to fall
within the scope of religious freedom because they are under-
stood to be too remote to attract legal protection.70
So too sexual orientation.  While there is less authoritative
guidance on the scope of activities protected as inherent in
sexual orientation than there is in relation to religion or politi-
cal opinion, the question must nonetheless be addressed.  Yet,
while the High Court of Australia tells us that “sexual identity
is not to be understood . . . as confined to particular sexual
acts . . . . It may, and often will, extend to many aspects of
human relationships and activit[ies],”71 the Court does not
identify which activity-based risks are beyond the scope of Con-
vention protection.  Is refugee status owed to gay claimants
whose risk follows only from holding hands, or kissing in pub-
lic?  To those at risk because they cohabit, marry, or decide to
raise children?  Moreover, the court’s implicit suggestion that
there are least some limits on the range of protected activities is
difficult to reconcile with its later assertion that “[t]he tribunal
has no jurisdiction or power to require anyone to do anything
in the country of nationality”72 and that “the question of what
an individual is entitled to do . . . distracts attention from the
fundamental question.”73
This apparently all-embracing position was taken to the
extreme by the United Kingdom Supreme Court, which sug-
gested that there really are no limits to the range of activity-
based risks that are fairly said to be risks “for reasons of sexual
orientation”:
In short, what is protected is the applicant’s right to
live freely and openly as a gay man.  That involves a
wide spectrum of conduct, going well beyond con-
duct designed to attract sexual partners and maintain
relationships with them.  To illustrate the point with
69. Human Rights Comm., Decision of the Human Rights Comm. under
the Optional Protocol to the Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Concerning Communication No. 446/1991, ¶ 4.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/43/
D/446/1991 (Nov. 8, 1991).
70. See infra text accompanying notes 232–233. R
71. S395 (2003) 216 CLR at 500–01 (Gummow & Hayne JJ).
72. Id. at 501 (Gummow & Hayne JJ) (emphasis added).  This is perhaps
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trivial stereotypical examples from British society: just
as male heterosexuals are free to enjoy themselves
playing rugby, drinking beer and talking about girls
with their mates, so male homosexuals are to be free
to enjoy themselves going to Kylie concerts, drinking
exotically coloured cocktails and talking about boys
with their straight female mates.  Mutatis mutandis—
and in many cases the adaptations would obviously be
great—the same must apply to other societies.  In
other words, gay men are to be as free as their
straight equivalents in the society concerned to live
their lives in the way that is natural to them as gay
men, without fear of persecution.74
Clearly, going to concerts, drinking cocktails, or engaging
in “boy talk” with female friends should not attract persecu-
tion.  But it does not necessarily follow that a grant of asylum is
owed where risk follows only from a relatively trivial activity
that could be avoided without significant human rights cost.
To have adopted such a far-reaching vision of the nexus
clause, without interrogating the scope of the international
non-discrimination law that informs it, risks fracturing the nor-
mative consensus upon which the Refugee Convention is
based.  Beyond identifying “sexual orientation” as a form of
protected status, there was a duty on the courts to grapple with
the scope of activities properly understood to be inherent in,
and an integral part of, that status.  As a branch of public inter-
national law grounded in the consent of states it is surely criti-
cal, as the English Court of Appeal has insisted, to search for
“a common standard, or uniform approach . . . firmly based on
some conception of objective principle which is recognised as
a legitimate source of law.”75
In the result, we are of the view that the decisions in S395
and HJ and HT are both under-inclusive and over-inclusive.
The reasoning is too conservative, in that it is insufficiently at-
tentive to the endogenous harms that follow from having con-
tinually to mask one’s true identity.  It is also too liberal, in
74. HJ (Iran) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t (HJ and HT), [2010]
UKSC 31, [78], [2011] 1 A.C. 596, 646 (Lord Rodger) (appeal taken from
Eng. & Wales C.A.).
75. Sepet v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2001] EWCA (Civ) 681,
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that it fails to interrogate the extant scope of “sexual orienta-
tion” as a protected interest to determine when there is a duty
to protect on the basis of associated activities, rather than sim-
ply as a function of identity per se.
Does it matter?  We believe that it does.  Courts attempt-
ing to apply the decisions in S395 and HJ and HT have strug-
gled to understand just how to justify recognizing refugee sta-
tus on the basis of a risk that will not, in fact, accrue.76  They
have also understandably balked at the prospect of finding a
nexus to a protected ground where risk appears to follow
neither from status nor from a closely connected activity.77
76. In some cases this has resulted in the outright rejection of a refugee
claim.  For example, Applicant NABD concerned an applicant who claimed to
fear persecution if returned to Iran on account of his conversion to Christi-
anity.  On the basis of his prior behavior, the tribunal considered that the
applicant would maintain a low profile if returned to Iran, and would “not
choose to generally broadcast his practice of Christianity or conspicuously
proselytize in Iran.” Applicant NABD of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Mul-
ticultural & Indigenous Affairs (Applicant NABD) (2005) 216 ALR 1, [103]
(Hayne Heydon JJ) (Austl.).  It concluded that if he were to practice his faith
in this way, there was not a “real chance” of his being persecuted.  A majority
of the Australian High Court upheld the decision of the tribunal:
The information available to the Tribunal about Iran was that
apostasy was punishable by death.  But the information suggested
that there was no real chance of that or other punishment being
exacted in any but exceptional cases . . . . Rather, . . . [t]he evi-
dence is that those converts who go about their devotions quietly
are generally not disturbed . . . .
. . . .
At no point in its chain of reasoning did the Tribunal divert
from inquiring about whether the fears which the appellant had
were well founded.  It did not ask (as the Tribunal had asked in
[S395]) whether the appellant could avoid persecution; it asked
what may happen to the appellant if he returned to Iran.  Based on
the material the Tribunal had, including the material concerning
what the appellant had done while in detention, it concluded that
were he to practise his faith in the way he chose to do so, there was
not a real risk of his being persecuted.
Id. [164], [168] (Hayne & Heydon JJ).  If the harm is to be defined (as it
was) as the exogenous harm that would follow from “proselytizing or actively
seeking attention,” this result is inevitable. Id. [167].
77. In the United Kingdom, for example, less than two months after the
decision was handed down in HJ and HT, the English Court of Appeal ex-
pressed concerns about its potential scope, and sought to limit the implica-
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In such an atmosphere, the “win” for gay applicants in
S395 and HJ and HT can hardly be thought secure.  It would
moreover be wrong to take no account of the collateral dam-
age for applicants claiming status on grounds of religion and
political opinion engendered by the confusing reasoning in
these decisions.78  Legal accuracy is important.79  Taxonomy
[T]here is a good case for saying that where the activity which
would create the risk of persecution is the need to deny disloyalty
to a political party by someone whose political interests or activities
are of marginal interest to their lives, this engages only the margins
of their human rights and the AIT would be entitled to conclude
that they would in fact be, and could be expected to be, less than
frank with the Zimbabwean authorities.  They would not be re-
quired to modify their beliefs or opinion in any real way.  It is one
thing for a person to be compelled to deny a crucial aspect of his
identity affecting his whole way of life, as in [HJ Iran].  Further-
more, the individual is then forced into a permanent state of de-
nial.  The Supreme Court found it unacceptable that someone
should have to live a lie in order to avoid persecution.  It does not
necessarily follow that in no circumstances can someone be ex-
pected to tell a lie to avoid that consequence.
TM (Zim.) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2010] EWCA (Civ) 916,
[41] (appeal taken from Asylum & Immigr. Trib.) (U.K.). Cf. RT (Zim.) v.
Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2010] EWCA (Civ) 1285, [2011] Imm.
A.R. 259 (appeal taken from Asylum & Immigr. Trib.) (U.K.) (rejecting a
distinction between being forced to lie about “core” and “marginal” activities
or beliefs). See infra text accompanying notes 253–55.  For an example from R
Australia, see NALZ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous
Affairs (2004) 86 ALD 1, [50], [52] (Austl.) (holding that the tribunal did
not err in denying asylum to a man who would only have to stop selling
electrical goods to certain customers to end the persecution in his home
country).
78. The broader implications of S395 and HJ and HT have been expressly
recognized in appellate decisions applying the respective cases.  For exam-
ple, in NALZ, Madgwick J states that “the reasoning of the majority judges
[in S395] was clearly expressed in deliberately broader, conceptual terms”
and that “the potential impact of this reasoning [in S395] is, no doubt, far
reaching.” NALZ (2004) 86 ALD 1, [5], [8].  In TM (Zim.), Elias LJ stated
that “[p]lainly the ratio of [HJ and HT] is not limited just to sexual orienta-
tion cases but will apply to all grounds covered by the Convention.” TM
(Zim.), [2010] EWCA (Civ) 916, [38].
79. As recognized by Kirby J in Applicant NABD: “I remind myself of the
importance of legal accuracy in decisions of this kind.  In a case such as the
present, decisions of this kind can literally affect the lives of those subject to
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matters.80  Particularly because the Australian High Court and
United Kingdom Supreme Court enjoy such authority in the
“transnational judicial conversation”81 at the heart of creative
thinking on refugee law,82 it is important not only to reach
“the right” result—which, in our view, the courts did—but also
to reach that result on the basis of reasons that do not pose a
risk of doctrinal distortion, and which will withstand the test of
time.
We believe that the judgments in S395 and HJ and HT fail
this test.  First, as developed in Part I, the courts’ reliance on
the risk of exogenous harm that will not, in fact, accrue to find
a “well-founded fear” of being persecuted is flatly contradic-
tory to the jurisprudence of all leading courts, under which
there must be a real chance or serious possibility of the posited
form of persecution.  If there is no objective basis to believe
that the harm said to be persecutory may well occur, the appli-
cant’s fear cannot be said to be well-founded.
Second and related, both courts failed to identify the en-
dogenous harm occasioned by behavior modification as a rele-
vant form of persecutory harm in cases of enforced conceal-
ment despite the fact that this is the harm that is most likely to
be objectively well-founded.  As discussed in Part II, the view
that serious psychological harm is cognizable persecution en-
joys nascent support in many courts and is in line with interna-
tional human rights norms that inform the serious harm ele-
ment of “being persecuted.”  A strong affirmation in the com-
80. See Peter Birks, Equity in the Modern Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy, 26
U. W. AUSTL. L. REV. 1, 97 (1996) (“It is essential in modern society that the
law be closely and cogently reasoned . . . . [L]egal certainty is impossible if
and so long as taxonomy is neglected”).
81. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29
U. RICH. L. REV. 99 (1994).
82. See Eval Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Use of Foreign
and International Law by National Courts, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 241, 264–67
(2008) (noting how national courts, through citing each other’s interpreta-
tion of the Refugee Convention, interpreted the Convention collectively);
James C. Hathaway, A Forum for the Transnational Development of Refugee Law:
The IARLJ’s Advanced Refugee Law Workshop,15 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 418 (2003)
(discussing the IARLJ, which furthers the transnational judicial conversation
by allowing judges to collectively analyze refugee law); Michael Kirby, Trans-
national Judicial Dialogue, the Internationalisation of Law and Australian Judges, 9
MELB. J. INT’L L. 171 (2008) (discussing the increasing trend of Australian
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pelling context of these cases would have made a major
contribution to clarifying what has become an increasingly
prevalent concern.
Third, and despite the intuitive appeal of Lord Rodger’s
promotion of a genuinely liberated global society where all gay
men—if they were so inclined83—could attend Kylie concerts,
sip cocktails, or talk about other men, it does not follow in our
view that risk accruing solely from one of these activities can
be reconciled with the protective limits built into the nexus
clause of the Refugee Convention.  As raw as it might sound,
the international community has not yet consented to “pick up
the pieces” for every action that leads to even serious and un-
remediated harm.  To the contrary, the “for reasons of” clause
was included in the Refugee Convention precisely to delimit
the scope of the refugee class to those persons at risk of seri-
ous harm for reasons deemed fundamental.  As developed in Part
III, many actions are, of course, appropriately included in the
forms of civil or political status enumerated in the refugee def-
inition.  But it is equally clear that the non-discrimination
norm that informs the five grounds of claim is not without lim-
itation.  To read the Convention as essentially boundless is not
in our view helpful to the cause of ensuring that the protection
needs of sexual minorities are fairly and reliably addressed.84
83. In HJ and HT, Lord Rodger acknowledged that these are “stereotypi-
cal examples” of male homosexual conduct.  HJ (Iran) v Sec’y of State for
the Home Dep’t (HJ and HT), [2010] UKSC 31, [78], [2011] 1 A.C. 596, 646
(Lord Rodger) (appeal taken from Eng. & Wales C.A.).
84. Indeed, although outside the scope of this article, there is an argu-
ment that the lack of normative guidance on the scope of what is a textually
obvious limitation could inspire some subsequent decision makers to invent
new means to avoid the recognition of gay refugee claims. See Millbank,
supra note 15, at 392 (referring to the applicants from S395 as an illustration R
of this recent trend).  Millbank states:
[H]aving brought a rare successful claim for judicial review to the
ultimate appellate court in Australia, the men had their claim re-
mitted to the tribunal for re-determination, expecting that it would
consider whether they faced a real chance of persecution given that
this was the issue in dispute at all five levels of adjudication.  Yet on
remittal the second tribunal decided that they were not gay after
all, and this decision was then held to be unreviewable by the
courts.
Id. at 392–93 (citations omitted).  The Tribunal decision referred to by
Millbank was overturned on appeal in NAOX v Minister for Immigration &
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I. HOW CAN AN IMPLAUSIBLE RISK BE REAL?
The case of S395 involved the application for refugee sta-
tus of two gay Bangladeshi men “who had been living in Ban-
gladesh in a domestic relationship” and had been “ostracized
by their families.”85  One applicant recounted “that local peo-
ple abused, insulted, bashed and tortured him”86 and that af-
ter he and his partner moved to another location “they were
attacked and beaten, and their possessions were destroyed.”87
His partner testified that he had been “attacked on a number
of occasions by Islamic fundamentalists,”88 “sentenced by the
fundamentalists to 300 lashes of a whip with a stone on the
end”89 and been “condemned to death by stoning.”90  Both ap-
plicants claimed to be “captives in [their] homeland”91 and
feared that they would be “killed not only by the fundamental-
ists but also by the general masses.”92
The allegations of past persecution were, however, found
not to be credible, leading the tribunal to focus exclusively on
the prospect of forward-looking risk.  Because the couple
framed their case around the risks that would accrue if they
lived an openly gay life, their protection requests were denied
by the first level tribunal on the grounds that they
did not experience serious harm or discrimination
prior to their departure from Bangladesh, and . . .
there is [no] real chance that they will be persecuted
because of their sexuality if they return. . . . [W]hile
homosexuality is not acceptable in Bangladesh, Ban-
gladeshis generally prefer to ignore the issue rather
than confront it.  [The applicants] lived together for
over 4 years without experiencing any more than mi-
nor problems with anyone outside their own families.
They clearly conducted themselves in a discreet man-
85. Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs
(S395) (2003) 216 CLR 473, 479 (Gleeson CJ) (Austl.)
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ner and there is no reason to believe that they will
not continue to do so if returned home now.93
The High Court of Australia adopted this conclusion, and pro-
ceeded to assess the applicants’ claims based on the finding
that they would, in fact, conceal their sexual identity if re-
turned to Bangladesh.
The reasoning of the United Kingdom Supreme Court in
HJ and HT is also predicated on the view that the applicants
would modify their behavior if sent home.  In relation to the
Iranian applicant, the court relied on the finding below that
“the appellant is now much more aware of the legal prohibi-
tions on homosexuals in Iran and the potential punishments
for breach of those prohibitions . . . . We are satisfied that as a
matter of fact he would behave discreetly.”94  In the compan-
ion Cameroonian case, the Supreme Court adopted the con-
clusion of the initial tribunal “that in addition to conducting
any relationship in private, [the applicant] would move to an-
other part of the country where he would not be known.”95
The reasoning of the Supreme Court thus proceeded to con-
93. Id. at 481 (quoting the lower Tribunal’s factual finding).
94. HJ (Iran) v Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t (HJ and HT), [2010]
UKSC 31, [43], [2011] 1 A.C. 596, 633 (appeal taken from Eng. & Wales
C.A.) (quoting the lower Tribunal’s factual finding).
95. Id. [43], [2011] 1 A.C. at 633 (Lord Rodger).  This assumption relies
on the unfortunate holding of the House of Lords in Januzi v. Secretary of
State for the Home Department, [2006] UKHL 5, [2006] 2 A.C. 426 (appeal
taken from Eng. & Wales C.A.), that an applicant can be required to relocate
to a place of “safety” even if the home government is unable affirmatively to
protect his or her human rights there.  We believe this to be a misconstruc-
tion of the duty of internal protection conceived in consonance with the
text, object, and purpose of the Refugee Convention. See James C. Hathaway
& Michelle Foster, Internal Protection/Relocation/Flight Alternative as an Aspect of
Refugee Status Determination, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
UNHCR’S GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 357 (Er-
ika Feller et al. eds., 2007) (arguing against the practice of denying refugee
status to refugee seekers who are able to relocate internally within their
home state); James C. Hathaway, The Michigan Guidelines on Protection Else-
where, Adopted January 3, 2007, 28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 207 (2007) (stating that
the insistence that protection for refugees be provided elsewhere may result
in the denial to refugees of their rights under the Convention and providing
guidelines for the reliance on protections provided by states other than the
home state).  In any event, as Lord Rodger conceded in HJ and HT:
[T]here appears to have been nothing in the evidence to suggest
that there was any area of Cameroon where gay men could live
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sider eligibility for refugee status on the basis that there was
essentially no chance that the truly horrific exogenous harms
that would follow from being openly gay—imprisonment with
the possibility of torture in Iran, and savage physical assaults in
Cameroon—would eventuate.96
In view of these findings, how did the courts find a well-
founded fear?  Both the High Court and Supreme Court ex-
pressly acknowledged the central importance of the prospec-
tive examination of risk,97 but sidestepped its application by
failing explicitly to identify an objective risk of persecutory
harm.98  Indeed, Lord Rodger appears to treat the applicant’s
applicant be returning to a part of the country where the state
would protect him from persecution.
HJ and HT, [2010] UKSC 31, [84], [2011] 1 A.C. at 648.  For an interesting
analysis on the implications of HJ and HT to the jurisprudence on internal
protection in the U.K. context, see Richard Buxton, Asylum and the Doctrine of
Internal Flight in the Light of HJ (Iran), 70 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 41 (2011).
96. In truth, there are reasons to doubt the factual accuracy of the find-
ings of the lower tribunals in HJ and HT.  The initial tribunal did not contest
the Iranian applicant’s assertion that as an openly gay man it was “impossi-
ble” for him to return to his country. HJ and HT, [2010] UKSC 31, [43],
[2011] 1 A.C. at 633.  Regarding the issue of whether the applicant “would”
(as opposed to “should”) internally relocate, see supra note 95. R
97. In S395, the High Court considered that the “central question” for a
decision maker is whether or not there is a real chance that the applicant
will be persecuted if returned to their country of origin. S395 (2003) CLR at
495, 500 (Gummow & Hayne JJ).  In a similar vein the Supreme Court in HJ
and HT affirmed that the Refugee Convention is concerned with the pro-
spective assessment of risk and that this necessitates an examination of what
the applicant will “actually do” if returned to their country of origin. HJ and
HT, [2010] UKSC 31, [82], [109], [2011] 1 A.C. at 647–48 (Lord Rodger),
656 (Lord Dyson).  Lord Hope was particularly emphatic:
It should always be remembered that the purpose of this exercise is
to separate out those who are entitled to protection because their
fear of persecution is well founded from those who are not.  The
causative condition is central to the inquiry.  This makes it neces-
sary to concentrate on what is actually likely to happen to the appli-
cant.  As Lord Walker says in para 88, the inquiry is directed to
what will happen in the future if the applicant is returned to his
own country.  An approach which disregards what is in fact likely to
occur there in the case of the particular applicant is wrong and
should not be adopted.
Id. [36], [2011] 1 A.C. at 631.
98. S395 (2003) 216 CLR at 490 (Gummow & Hayne JJ, 503 (McHugh &
Kirby JJ); HJ and HT, [2010] UKSC 31, [35]–[36], [82], [2011] 1 A.C. at





      03/19/2012   11:22:47
31420-nyi_44-2 Sheet No. 19 Side A      03/19/2012   11:22:47
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYI\44-2\NYI202.txt unknown Seq: 29  8-MAR-12 9:05
2012] QUEER CASES MAKE BAD LAW 343
subjective motives as dispositive of the “well-founded fear” re-
quirement, drawing a direct and unqualified link between the
applicant’s subjective motive and the satisfaction of the well-
founded fear requirement.  In his view, where an applicant has
chosen to modify his conduct primarily because of a fear of
exogenous harm, refugee status should be recognized because
“[s]uch a person has a well-founded fear of persecution.”99
This reasoning suggests that, where the threat of exogenous
harm motivates an applicant to be discreet, there is of neces-
sity a well-founded fear of that exogenous harm occurring.
But the reality is precisely the opposite since the modification
of behavior will, in most cases, obviate the risk.100
99. HJ and HT, [2010] UKSC 31, [82], [2011] 1 A.C. at 647–48 (Lord
Rodger) (emphasis added).
100. Quite apart from the doctrinal difficulties, the analytical focus in
S395 and HJ and HT on the reasons why an applicant would conceal or sup-
press his behavior runs the risk of inviting subjective assumptions about nat-
ural discretion, often informed by narrow (and often stereotyped) under-
standings of sexual identity. See generally Millbank, supra note 15 (discussing R
Australian tribunal judges’ use of stereotypical notions of “gayness” as a tem-
plate for evaluating refugee applicants). In order to avoid the far-reaching
implications of S395 decision makers have engaged in “mental-gymnastics”
to find that applicants were not oppressed, but rather were discreet as a mat-
ter of “free choice.” Applicant NABD of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Mul-
ticultural & Indigenous Affairs (Applicant NABD) (2005) 216 ALR 1, [140]
(Kirby J) (Austl.).  Justices Callinan and Heydon expressly provided for this
route in their dissenting judgment in S395:
It is clear that the appellants did not seek to make a case that
they wished to express their homosexuality in other than a discreet,
indeed personal, way.  There may be good reason, divorced entirely
from fear, for this.  They may have wished to avoid disapproval of
the, or a significant section of the, society in which they lived, per-
haps even marked disapproval. . . .
. . . .
On the Tribunal’s findings, no fear of such harm as could
fairly be characterized as persecution imposed a need for any par-
ticular discretion on the part of the appellants: such “discretion” as
they exercised, was exercised as a matter of free choice.
S395 (2003) 216 CLR at 511, 513.  The Supreme Court in HJ and HT also
made clear that some motives for concealment or suppression are outside
the ambit of refugee law.  Lord Hope, for example, refers to discretion that
stems from fear of
[s]ocial and family disapproval of overt sexual behaviour of any
kind, gay or straight, [which] may weigh more heavily with some
people than others.  Concealment due to a well-founded fear of
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While there is disagreement about whether the “well-
founded fear” requirement requires demonstration of subjec-
tive trepidation as well as evidence of forward-looking risk101—
we believe that it does not102—there is no authority whatso-
cial pressures is another. So one must ask why the applicant will
conduct himself in this way.  A carefully nuanced approach is called
for, to separate out those who are truly in need of surrogate protec-
tion from those who are not.
HJ and HT, [2010] UKSC 31, [22], [2011] 1 A.C. at 625.  Yet it is surely
readily apparent that the line between discretion consequent to purely pri-
vate and non-cognizable concerns and discretion as the result of a fear of
being persecuted reflected in the prevalence of such social attitudes is a very
hard one to draw in practice.  The “carefully nuanced approach” that Lord
Hope calls for is therefore likely as a practical matter unviable, leading to an
extraordinary opportunity for judicial subjectivity.
101. Standard doctrine suggests that the “well-founded fear” inquiry con-
tains both a subjective and objective element. See, e.g., I.N.S. v, Cardoza-Fon-
seca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987) (“[T]hat the fear must be ‘well-founded’ does
not alter the obvious focus on the individual’s subjective beliefs.”); Minister
for Immigration & Citizenship v SZJGV (2009) 259 ALR 595, [53] (Austl.)
(“[T]he Convention definition of refugee has been held to encompass both
subjective and objective elements. The subjective question is whether the
applicant . . . has a fear of persecution.  If that question is answered in the
affirmative, the following question, whether that fear is well-founded, is an
objective one.”).  There are also various statements supporting the existence
of the subjective element in the UNHCR’s Handbook on Procedures and
Criteria for Determining Refugee Status.  For example, the Handbook states:
To the element of fear—a state of mind and a subjective condi-
tion—is added the qualification ‘well-founded.’ This implies that it
is not only the frame of mind of the person concerned that deter-
mines his refugee status, but that the frame of mind must be sup-
ported by an objective situation.  The term ‘well-founded fear’
therefore contains a subjective and an objective element . . . .
U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for
Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Pro-
tocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/Rev.1, ¶
38 (Jan. 1992), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/
3ae6b3314.html [hereinafter UNHCR Handbook].
102. See Yusuf v Can. [1992] 1 FC 629, para. 5 (Can. C.A.) (“It is true, of
course, that the definition of a Convention refugee has always been inter-
preted as including a subjective and an objective element . . . . [But] I find it
hard to see in what circumstances it could be said that a person . . . could be
right in fearing persecution and still be rejected because it is said that fear
does not actually exist in his conscience.  The definition of a refugee is cer-
tainly not designed to exclude brave or simply stupid persons in favour of
those who are more timid or more intelligent.  Moreover, I am loath to be-
lieve that a refugee status claim could be dismissed on the ground that as the
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ever for the view that evidence of forward-looking, objective
risk can be dispensed with.103  Even the United States Su-
preme Court, which has opined that there is an “obvious focus
on the individual’s subjective beliefs,” nonetheless insists that
those beliefs can justify asylum only if also objectively
grounded.104  While courts have framed the objective standard
in various ways—a “reasonable possibility,”105 a “reasonable de-
gree of likelihood,”106 a “serious possibility,”107 or a “real
chance”108—the upshot of all the tests is much the same.
Whatever the applicant believes, refugee status is to be recog-
nized only where there is credible evidence (though it need
not rise to the level of a probability109) that the harm said to
be persecutory may well occur.110
or she was incapable of experiencing fear, the reasons for which clearly exist
in objective terms”); Win v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs
[2001] FCA 132, [20] (Austl.) (“It is not fatal to such a claim of persecution
that the claimant fails to show that he or she is a leading exponent of a claim
to, or a wish to, exercise such rights.”); HATHAWAY, supra note 18, ch. 3 (dis- R
cussing the elements of “well-founded fear” in refugee law); James C.
Hathaway & William S. Hicks, Is There a Subjective Element in the Refugee Con-
vention’s Requirement of ‘Well-Founded Fear’?, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 505 (2004)
(arguing that there is no subjective element in the “well-founded fear” stan-
dard); James C. Hathaway, The Michigan Guidelines on Well-Founded Fear,
Adopted March 28, 2004, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L 493, 497 (2004)  (“The existence
of subjective fearfulness in the sense of trepidation should neither be a con-
dition precedent to recognition of refugee status, nor advantage an appli-
cant who faces an otherwise insufficiently well-established risk.”).
103. United States domestic legislation provides, however, for a remedy
beyond that contemplated by the Refugee Convention, allowing for a grant
of “asylum” to persons who are unable to return home “because of persecu-
tion or a well-founded fear of persecution . . . .”  Immigration and National-
ity Act § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006).
104. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 431.
105. Id. at 440.
106. R. v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t (Sivakumaran), [1988] 1 A.C.
958, [78] (appeal taken from Eng. & Wales C.A.).
107. Chan v. Canada (Ministry of Emp’t & Immigration), [1995] 3 SCR
593, para. 120 (Can.).
108. Chan Yee Kin v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169
CLR 379, 388 (Austl.).
109. See Cordoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 431 (“That the fear must be ‘well-
founded’ does . . . not transform the standard into a ‘more likely than not’
one.  One can certainly have a well-founded fear of an event happening
when there is less than a 50% chance of the occurrence taking place.”).
110. “[T]he relevant inquiry [is] whether a reasonable person in the asy-
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In some, perhaps many, cases, “discretion” will prove im-
possible.  This may be on account of the fact that even “dis-
creet” members of sexual minorities are being sought out for
persecution,111 it might reflect the reality that concealment is
not a realistic possibility for a particular claimant,112 or there
may be a real chance that the applicant will be “outed” not-
withstanding the modification of behavior.  But if, as in S395
and HJ and HT, this is found not to be the case, the risk of
exogenous harm for a person who would opt for self-repres-
sion is no more than “remote,”113  “insubstantial,”114 or a “far-
fetched possibility.”115  The problem that arises in both S395
and HJ and HT is thus clear: because, on the facts found or
assumed by the courts, the applicants would conceal their iden-
tity as gay men and would therefore not face any real chance of
imprisonment, physical assault, or other exogenous harm, a
claim based on such harm must fail.  As long as the persecu-
tory harm is conceived as the exogenous harm that would re-
sult from living an openly gay life, it is impossible to show the
existence of the objectively grounded, forward-looking risk
that refugee law requires.
II. WHY AVOID RECOGNIZING ENDOGENOUS HARM?
In their pursuit of fair treatment of the cautious gay appli-
cant, the Australian and British courts failed to identify the
risk of any persecutory harm that could honestly be said to be
“well-founded.”  Having done so, the basis upon which they
recognized refugee status in S395 and HJ and HT is doctrinally
unsound.  While their strong condemnation of a “duty of dis-
cretion” is both laudable and long overdue, it cannot displace
the responsibility to ground refugee status in the real risk of a
persecutory harm.
This is not to say, however, that there was no well-founded
fear of being persecuted in the two cases.  To the contrary, we
I.N.S., 208 F.3d 323, 330 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting Aguilar-Solis v. I.N.S., 168
F.3d 565, 572 (1st Cir. 1999)).
111. The story of Anne Frank provides a pointed example. See infra note
130. R
112. See supra text accompanying note 43. R
113. Chan Yee Kin (1989) 169 CLR at 389 (Mason C.J.).
114. Id. at 398 (Dawson J.).
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believe that there was.  The error, in our view, was the courts’
failure to identify the harm that is plausible—indeed, likely—
in a case of self-repression of one’s sexual identity.  For rea-
sons developed below, the real risk in such cases will be the
harm implicit in concealment, or that occasioned by the modi-
fication of one’s behavior or suppression of one’s fundamental
identity.  Even though the exogenous consequences of being
openly gay are remote in cases of enforced discretion, the en-
dogenous harms that follow from self-repression are likely to be
readily established.  And because such harms will often
amount to the violation of core internationally recognized
human rights, they are, if coupled with the home state’s failure
to counter the precipitating risk, appropriately recognized
under prevailing doctrine as persecutory.
Sadly, the applicants bear some measure of responsibility
for the failure of the Australian and British courts to pinpoint
the endogenous harms as the relevant persecution.  In S395,
the applicants based their claims on the risk of the exogenous
harm that would follow from living an openly gay lifestyle.116
On appeal to the Federal Court, Judge Lindgren noted the
applicants “did not complain that they had to modify their be-
haviour so as not to attract attention.”117  Similarly, the Chief
Justice of Australia observed that
[i]t was never part of the claim advanced by the ap-
pellants to the Tribunal that the persecution they
had experienced in the past, and apprehended in fu-
ture, took the form of repression of behavior about
which they desired to be more open, and that they
escaped harm only by concealing their relation-
ship.118
The parties in HJ and HT went further, expressly rejecting
identification of the harm as their experience of self-repres-
116. “It is to be emphasized that the first appellant’s claim of fear of fu-
ture persecution was based upon an account of violence, torture, and con-
demnation to death, and a prediction of death or serious injury, not upon
any supposed concern about being obliged, against his will, to behave dis-
creetly.” Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs
(S395) (2003) 216 CLR 473, 480 (Gleeson CJ) (Austl.).
117. Kabir v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 968,
[19] (Austl.).
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sion.119  Astoundingly, even the UNHCR’s intervention argued
that “[t]here is no separate question of whether the modifica-
tion [of behavior] is itself persecution”120—thus advancing a
less-inclusive position than that taken in the Organization’s
own Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Sexual Orienta-
tion and Gender Identity:
Being compelled to forsake or conceal one’s sexual
identity, where this is instigated or condoned by the
State, may amount to persecution. LGBT persons
who live in fear of being publicly identified will often
conceal their sexual orientation as a result in order to
avoid the severe consequences of such exposure, in-
cluding the risk of incurring harsh penalties, arbi-
trary house raids, dismissal from employment and so-
cietal disapproval.  Such actions can not only be con-
sidered discriminatory and as violating the right to
privacy, but also as infringing the right to freedom of
opinion and expression.121
The judgment in S395 displays at least a glimmer of recog-
nition that the relevant persecutory harm may be that occa-
sioned by the modification of behavior.  Justices McHugh and
Kirby in the High Court of Australia characterize the nature of
the relevant harm as the
119. In a case such as the present, the relevant persecution is the ob-
jective serious harm that would occur were the applicant’s sexual
identity to become disclosed, rather than the individual experience
of suppression. The domestic courts have, with respect, wrongly
identified the relevant persecution as the latter, requiring the indi-
vidual to show that his experience of suppression is not reasonably
tolerable.  This conceptual error is the result of a misreading of the
leading decision of the Australian High Court in [S395].
Case on Behalf of the Appellant, [99], HJ (Iran) v. Sec’y of State for the
Home Dep’t (HJ and HT), [2010] UKSC 31, [2011] 1 A.C. 596 (appeal taken
from Eng. & Wales C.A.) (on file with authors).
120. Case on Behalf of the First Intervener (U.N. High Comm’r for Refu-
gees), [39], HJ and HT, [2010] UKSC 31, [2011] 1 A.C. 596 (on file with
authors).
121. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, UNHCR Guidance Note on Refu-
gee Claims Relating to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, ¶ 12 (Nov.
21, 2008), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/48abd5660.
html.  This paragraph is referred to in the UNHCR’s submissions in HJ and
HT.  Case on Behalf of the First Intervener (U.N. High Comm’r for Refu-
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threat of harm.  In such cases, the well-founded fear of
persecution held by the applicant is the fear that, un-
less that person acts to avoid the harmful conduct, he
or she will suffer harm.  It is the threat of serious harm
with its menacing implications that constitutes the
persecutory conduct.122
Despite the confusing characterization of the “threat” as the
relevant harm, the judges’ reference to the resultant “menac-
ing implications” signals their awareness that the applicants’
psychological response is the real persecutory harm.
Similarly, the Court of Appeal decision under review in HJ
and HT had, in fact, recognized endogenous harm as the rele-
vant risk, applying prior authority that a claim can be estab-
lished where the applicant is forced to modify his behavior in a
way that is “sufficiently significant in itself to place himself in a
position of persecution.”123  The Secretary of State advanced
this position before the Supreme Court, drawing on the plight
of Anne Frank:
If [Anne Frank] escaped and claimed asylum, the
question would be whether she faced a real risk of
persecution on return.  The real Anne Frank would
have been a refugee because she obviously did and
therefore her example may not be helpful.  But if
(improbably) it was found that on return to Holland
she would successfully avoid detection by hiding in
the attic, the answer to the first stage of inquiry would
be that she was not at real risk of persecution by the
Nazis.  But the second stage would be to ask whether
permanent enforced confinement in her attic would
itself amount to persecution.  If it would, she would
be a refugee.124
The Secretary of State’s submission was embraced by Sir John
Dyson, who opined that “[e]ven if it could be imagined that
Anne Frank, as an asylum seeker, would not objectively have
been at risk of being discovered in the attic, she would never-
122. S395 (2003) 216 CLR at 490.
123. HJ (Iran) v Sec’y of State for the Home Department, [2009] EWCA
(Civ) 172, [8], [2009] Imm. A.R. 600 (Pills L.J.) (appeal taken from Asylum
& Immigr. Trib.) (U.K.) (emphasis added).
124. Case for the Respondent, [68], HJ and HT, [2010] UKSC 31, [2011] 1
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theless have had a well-founded fear of serious harm, a fear
not eliminated by her decision to conceal her identity as a Jew
and live in the attic.”125  Lord Hope simply raised the question
“whether opting for discretion itself amounted to persecu-
tion,” but made no attempt to answer it.126
Lord Walker, on the other hand, considered that a focus
on the harm occasioned by modification of behavior “may be
an unnecessary complication, and lead to confusion,”127 while
Lord Rodger made the unclear suggestion that this approach
would require the applicant “to establish a form of secondary
persecution.”128  Most forcefully of all, Lord Collins unequivo-
cally rejected the notion: “Simply to re-state the Secretary of
State’s argument shows that it is not possible to characterize it
as anything other than absurd and unreal. It is plain that it re-
mains the threat to Jews of the concentration camp and the gas cham-
ber which constitutes the persecution.”129
We believe that Lord Collins’ reasoning is mistaken.  The
submission of the Secretary of State was neither absurd nor
unreal.  To the contrary, if it were found that Anne Frank
could have successfully avoided detection by hiding in the
attic,130 then the Secretary of State is entirely correct to say
that she was not at real risk of being sent to the concentration
camps.  Yet this would, as the Secretary of State argued, not
require that Anne Frank be denied refugee status.  The risk of
permanent enforced confinement would itself be the violation
of a core human right and hence a sufficiently serious form of
harm to give rise to a risk of being persecuted.  Lord Walker
recognized as much when he noted that “[t]he conditions
which [Anne Frank] had to endure, confined in her attic away
from the normal pleasures of childhood and in constant fear
125. HJ and HT, [2010] UKSC 31, [118], [2011] 1 A.C. at 658.
126. Id. [24], [2011] 1 A.C. at 626.
127. Id. [96], [2011] 1 A.C. at 653.
128. Id. [75], [2011] 1 A.C. at 645.
129. Id. [107], [2011] 1 A.C. at 655 (emphasis added).
130. We know of course that the risk was not remote, with history provid-
ing clear evidence that the Frank family was at all times at serious risk of
being discovered.  The Frank family was discovered on the morning of 4
August 1944, and arrested by Dutch members of the Security Police.  It is
believed that Anne Frank (and her sister Margot) died in Bergen-Belsen, a
concentration camp near Hanover, Germany. ANNE FRANK, THE DIARY OF A
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of discovery, were certainly severe enough to be described as
persecution.”131
The problem with the approach adopted by the Court of
Appeal in HJ and HT is not the conceptualization of the harm
as the endogenous harm, but rather the “reasonable tolerabil-
ity” overlay the court insisted was required to substantiate a
finding of persecution.132  Although in the Supreme Court the
Secretary of State attempted to downplay the significance of
the “reasonable tolerability” standard, referring to it as no
more than “shorthand” for the ordinary test for being perse-
cuted,133 it seems clear that the Court of Appeal used the test
to, amongst other things, legitimate deference to the social
mores of the country of origin.134  In its (fully justified) deter-
mination to distance itself from this misguided “reasonable tol-
erability” overlay, the Supreme Court seems unfortunately also
to have discarded without analysis the distinct but underlying
notion that serious endogenous harm may amount to a risk of
being persecuted.
It would, in truth, have been straightforward for both the
Australian High Court and United Kingdom Supreme Court
to have recognized the harm occasioned by the modification
of one’s behavior or suppression of one’s identity as persecu-
tory harm, drawing on the established view of the risk of being
persecuted as comprised of the sustained or systemic failure of
state protection in relation to one of the core entitlements
that has been recognized by the international community.135
Indeed, there are at least two ways136 in which application of
131. HJ and HT, [2010] UKSC 31, [96], [2011] 1 A.C. at 653.
132. See id. [35], [73]-[81], [119]-[129], [2011] 1 A.C. at 630–31 (Lord
Hope), 644–47 (Lord Rodger), 658–661 (Lord Dyson) (discussing the “rea-
sonable tolerability” overlay).
133. Case for the Respondent, [68], HJ and HT, [2010] UKSC 31, [2011] 1
A.C. 596 (on file with authors).
134. For example, Pills L.J. in the Court of Appeals expressly noted  that a
“judgment as to what is reasonably tolerable is made in the context of the
particular society.”  HJ (Iran) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2009]
EWCA (Civ) 172, [32], [2009] Imm. A.R. 600  (appeal taken from Asylum &
Immigr. Trib.) (U.K.).
135. See supra note 18. R
136. The below discussion should not be read as an exhaustive treatment
of the full range of rights that might be relevant where a gay applicant has
engaged in self-oppression.  For example, in certain circumstances such self-
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this accepted framework could have yielded the substantive re-
sult embraced by the courts without the doctrinally suspect
recognition of refugee status based on the risk of a form of
(exogenous) harm that was not, in fact, plausible.  The first
approach is to define the harm as the modification of behavior
itself, amounting to the denial of the right to a private life.
The second approach is to define the harm as the psychologi-
cal harm occasioned by the modification of behavior.  In both
cases, the requirement that there be a failure of state protec-
tion will be readily established by the failure of the state to
provide a meaningful response to the precipitating cause of
the serious harm.137
A. Privacy
One approach, attributed to the decision of Rodger
Haines QC of the New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Au-
thority (“RSAA”) in Refugee Appeal No. 74665/03,138 identifies
risk to the right to privacy as the relevant harm.  In consider-
ing the case of a young man from Iran who feared that he
would be persecuted on account of his sexual orientation, the
RSAA accepted that homosexuality is illegal in Iran, and con-
tinues to be punished with extreme severity (ranging from the
death penalty to flogging).139  To avoid these sanctions, homo-
sexuality must be “carefully hidden under the camouflage of
feigned heterosexuality.”140
to freedom of expression.  Where the applicant is a child, self-oppression
may infringe the child-specific rights contained in the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 30–32.  It is important to be abso- R
lutely clear that this is not requiring the applicant to establish a secondary
form of persecutory harm.  The question is simply whether the state can and
will provide protection against the precipitating cause.
138. Refugee Appeal No. 74665/03 [2005] INLR 68 (N.Z.).  The analytical
strength of the New Zealand approach was expressly endorsed by the U.K.
Supreme Court in HJ and HT. HJ and HT, [2010] UKSC 31, [72],
[113]–[114], [2011] 1 A.C. at 644 (Lord Rodger), 657 (Lord Dyson).  In the
first English Court of Appeal case to consider HJ and HT, TM (Zimbabwe) v.
Secretary of State for the Home Department, the English Court of Appeal attrib-
uted particular weight to the Supreme Court’s reference to the RSAA ap-
proach.  TM (Zim.) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2010] EWCA
(Civ) 916, [39] (appeal taken from Asylum & Immigr. Trib.) (U.K.).
139. Refugee Appeal No. 74665/03, at para [34].
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Rather than artificially deeming risk of either the death
penalty or flogging to be “well-founded” simply because fear of
the same motivated the applicant to be discreet—the ap-
proach taken in S395 and HJ and HT—the New Zealand tribu-
nal instead examined the nature of the risk that would actually
accrue if the applicant were to be returned to Iran.  While con-
cealment would mean that the death penalty and flogging
were only remote possibilities (and therefore not “well-
founded” risks), this was so only because the applicant would
nearly certainly engage in a defensive act of “self-denial.”141
This submission to enforced concealment—not the remote
risk of death or flogging—was identified by the Authority as
the harm in relation to which there was a well-founded fear.
Drawing on its long-standing understanding of “the pre-
dicament of ‘being persecuted’ as the sustained or systemic vi-
olation of basic human rights demonstrative of a failure of
state protection,”142 the Authority relied on the right to pri-
vacy set by article 17 of the Civil and Political Covenant as its
benchmark.  Noting that, in the case of Toonen v. Australia,143
the UN Human Rights Committee determined both that “it is
undisputed that adult consensual sexual activity in private is
covered by the concept of ‘privacy’”144 and, most importantly,
that “the continued existence” of even an unenforced anti-sod-
omy law infringes the privacy right,145 the New Zealand Au-
thority determined that returning the applicant to Iran would
deny him “a meaningful ‘private’ life.”146  Opining that this
risk infringes a core norm of international human rights law,
the Authority determined that there was thus a genuine risk of
“being persecuted.”
While certainly plausible, it is of some concern that the
Authority’s approach relies on an interpretation of article 17
141. Id. at para [114].
142. Id.
143. Toonen v. Australia, Commc’n No. 488/1992, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/
50/D/488/1992 (Apr. 4, 1994) (Human Rights Comm.) [hereinafter
Toonen]; see also Refugee Appeal No. 74665/03, at paras [97]–[99], [103],
[105], [112], [123] (evaluating Toonen’s methodology).
144. Toonen, supra note 143, ¶ 8.2. R
145. Id.
146. Refugee Appeal No. 74665/03, at para [126].  In support of this finding,
the Authority relied heavily on the analysis of MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVE-
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of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) that is difficult to reconcile with the provision’s
rather conservative language.  Article 17 does not enshrine a
right to privacy in any absolute sense, but is simply a right not
to “be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with
[one’s] privacy . . . .”147  Given that framing, it is unclear that
the mere existence of unenforced anti-gay laws necessarily and
automatically amounts to “subject[ion] . . . to interference” as
the Authority assumed.  While the approach adopted by the
New Zealand Authority finds support in the European juris-
prudence,148 there are, of course, striking textual differences
between article 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR)—which provides an affirmative, right to “re-
spect for” private life—and the more constrained right to non-
interference codified by article 17.  Moreover, the Toonen pre-
cedent upon which the New Zealand decision relies has never
been expressly affirmed in the twenty years since the decision
was issued, much less enshrined in a general comment.
Second, because the structure of article 17 prohibits only
forms of interference that are “arbitrary,” the Human Rights
Committee has determined that the acceptability of interfer-
ence is to be assessed on the basis of whether it is “reasonable
in the particular circumstances.”149  It follows therefore that a
breach of article 17 is more readily established in relation to a
state where there is a general expectation of respect for auton-
omy and privacy.  Because of this context-sensitive overlay built
into the ICCPR, the decision in Toonen may well have been
147. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 17, opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (emphasis
added).
148. The cognate right under the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950,
213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR] has been interpreted to comprise “the
right to establish and to develop relationships with other human beings, es-
pecially in the emotional field, for the development and fulfillment of one’s
own personality.”  X v. Iceland, App. No. 6825/75, 5 Eur. Comm’n Dec. &
Rep. 86, 87 (1976).
149. Canepa v. Canada, Commc’n No. 558/1993, ¶ 11.4, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/59/D/558/1/1993 (Apr. 3, 1997) (Human Rights Comm.); U.N.
Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 16: Article 17 (Right to Pri-
vacy): The Right to Respect of Privacy, Family, Home and Correspondence,
and Protection of Honour and Reputation, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/





      03/19/2012   11:22:47
31420-nyi_44-2 Sheet No. 25 Side A      03/19/2012   11:22:47
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYI\44-2\NYI202.txt unknown Seq: 41  8-MAR-12 9:05
2012] QUEER CASES MAKE BAD LAW 355
influenced by “evidence of general Australian tolerance of ho-
mosexual lifestyle . . . .”150  If so, Toonen—and therefore, the
article 17 argument dependent on it, relied on by the New
Zealand Authority—may provide an insecure basis upon which
to find that return to the sorts of states from which gay refugee
claimants typically flee justifies finding a risk of “being perse-
cuted” there.151
Finally, and more generally, there is surely a conceptual
incongruity in relying on denial of a right to “privacy” as the
means by which to recognize the serious harm faced by gay
applicants who are forced to accept repression in order to be
safe.  Far too often, “privacy”—in a very absolute, unforgiving
sense—is precisely what these refugee claimants seek to avoid.
150. Sarah Joseph, Gay Rights Under the ICCPR – Commentary on Toonen v.
Australia, UNIV. TAS. L. REV. 392, 407 (1994).  The U.N. Human Rights Com-
mittee in Toonen explained its reasoning thus:
The Committee cannot accept either that for the purposes of arti-
cle 17 of the Covenant, moral issues are exclusively a matter of do-
mestic concern, as this would open the door to withdrawing from
the Committee’s scrutiny a potentially large number of statutes in-
terfering with privacy.  It further notes that with the exception of
Tasmania, all laws criminalizing homosexuality have been repealed
throughout Australia and that, even in Tasmania, it is apparent that
there is no consensus as to whether Sections 122 and 123 should
not also be repealed.  Considering further that these provisions are
not currently enforced, which implies that they are not deemed es-
sential to the protection of morals in Tasmania, the Committee
concludes that the provisions do not meet the ‘reasonableness’ test
in the circumstances of the case, and that they arbitrarily interfere
with Mr. Toonen’s right under article 17, paragraph 1.
Toonen, supra note 143, ¶ 8.6.  The relevance of the particular circum-
stances to a consideration of article 17 of the ICCPR was stressed in Gonzalez
v. Republic of Guyana, Commc’n No. 1246/2004, ¶ 14.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/
C/98/D/1246/2004 (May 21, 2010) (Human Rights Comm.).
151. The New Zealand decision itself questions Toonen’s approach to pri-
vacy upon which it otherwise relies, determining that “[i]t cannot be said
that criminalization of consensual homosexual acts is on its own sufficient to
establish a situation of ‘being persecuted.’ ” Refugee Appeal No. 74665/03, at
para [103].  Rather, the Authority considered that something more is re-
quired, namely that the anti-gay legislation be “accompanied by penal sanc-
tions of severity which are in fact enforced.” Id.; see also id. at para [112]
(“[T]he approach taken by the Human Rights Committee in Toonen has left
open the argument that in a similar case involving the domestic law of a
Muslim state that applies Islamic law, consideration must be given to the
public sensibility and morality obtained within Muslim societies, conceding
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They would, to the contrary, like very much to be able to be
who they are openly and without fear of severe consequences
that would follow from failure to remain entirely private about
their sexual orientation.  When a gay person craving freedom
nonetheless opts for concealment in order to be safe, he is not
in any meaningful sense faced with a loss of “privacy.”  As Ed-
win Cameroon, now a Justice of the South African Constitu-
tional Court, once argued, seeking to do an end run via pri-
vacy—in the refugee context or otherwise—might ultimately
do more damage than good:
[T]he privacy argument has detrimental effects on
the search for a society which is truly non-stigma-
tizing as far as sexual orientation is concerned.  On
the one hand, the privacy argument suggests that dis-
crimination against gays and lesbians is confined to
prohibiting conduct between adults in the bedroom.
This is manifestly not so.  On the other hand, the pri-
vacy argument may subtly reinforce the idea that ho-
mosexual intimacy is shameful or improper: that it is
tolerable so long as it is confined to the bedroom—
but that its implications cannot be countenanced
outside.  Privacy as a rationale for constitutional pro-
tection therefore goes insufficiently far, and has ap-
preciable drawbacks even on its own terms.152
Indeed, it could reasonably be argued that the concept of pri-
vacy, and the delineation between public and private spheres,
in part fueled the “duty of discretion” that courts have now
thankfully dismantled.
Rather than trying to shoehorn a right to be “out” or “visi-
bly different” into a right to “privacy,” it would in our view be
more prudent to build on the structure of equality law in or-
der to establish such a right.153  Indeed, the robust duty of
“equal protection of the law” enshrined in both article 7 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights154 and article 26 of the
152. Edwin Cameron, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Test Case for
Human Rights, 110 S. AFR. L.J. 450, 464 (1993).
153. Indeed, the scope of the non-discrimination and equality norms was
considered by the RSAA in Refugee Appeal No. 74665/03, at paras [94]–[103].
154. “All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimina-
tion to equal protection of the law.”  Universal Declaration of Human
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ICCPR155 affords a powerful platform from which to derive
such an understanding.  In contrast to the accessory non-dis-
crimination provision in article 2(1) of the ICCPR,156 article
26 provides an autonomous, non-derivate guarantee of “equal-
ity before the law.”  The provision—which provides a guaran-
tee of equality in relation to any matter regulated by law—
might be relied on to challenge the legitimacy of any law sanc-
tioning the differential treatment of sexual minorities.  It has
been clearly established that the provision requires equal pro-
tection in the exercise of rights and freedoms enumerated in
any regional or international instruments, and, indeed, equal
protection in the exercise of rights and freedoms however es-
tablished by law.157  Although the power of article 26 is pres-
ently curtailed by the propensity of the Human Rights Com-
mittee to defer to state perceptions of “reasonableness” in de-
termining whether a given form of differentiation amounts to
discrimination,158 there is nonetheless scope for the “equal
155. All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect,
the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all per-
sons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any
ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status.
ICCPR, supra note 147, art. 26. R
156. The non-discrimination provisions contained in article 2(2) of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, and article 14 of the ECHR, supra
note 148, are similar to article 2(1) of the ICCPR. R
157. Nowak provides the following example: “The [ICCPR] contains no
provision granting a right to sit on a park bench. But when a State party
enacts a law forbidding Jews or blacks from sitting on public park benches,
then this law violates Art. 26.” NOWAK, supra note 146, at 604–05. See gener- R
ally Jason Pobjoy, Treating Like Alike: The Principle of Non-Discrimination as a
Tool to Mandate the Equal Protection of Refugee and Beneficiaries of Complementary
Protection, 34 MELB. UNIV. L. REV.181 (2010) (promoting article 26 of the
ICCPR as a valuable tool in protecting the rights of highly vulnerable indi-
viduals).
158. Differential treatment will not constitute a violation of article 26 if it
pursues a legitimate aim and is determined to be based on reasonable and
objective criteria. Specifically, the Human Rights Committee has interpreted
article 26 of the ICCPR to be subject to the proviso that “not every differenti-
ation of treatment will constitute discrimination, if the criteria for such dif-
ferentiation are reasonable and objective and if the aim is to achieve a pur-
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protection of the law” duty to play a more robust role in sexual
orientation cases, including to further an understanding of
equality law that embraces an affirmative right to be openly
different.
In sum, while the New Zealand Authority rightly recog-
nized the link between the “being persecuted” standard and
international human rights law, its reliance on the right to pri-
vacy to forge that link hangs by a thin thread.  It is worthy of
note that, even as it praised the logic of the approach adopted
by the New Zealand Authority, the Supreme Court in HJ and
HT declined to follow it.159  Moreover, as a matter of principle
there is something incongruous—and potentially, in the long
run, detrimental—about relying on a right to privacy to pro-
tect the rights of gay claimants seeking to live an openly gay
life.  And while the duty of “equal protection of the law” might
one day come to be understood as mandating an affirmative
“right to be different,” there is not yet a normative consensus
in favor of such a meaning.
In these circumstances, we believe that there is clear bene-
fit in exploring an alternative approach to conceptualizing the
relevant persecutory harm in cases of enforced concealment.
Focusing on the psychological harm occasioned by the modifi-
cation of behavior will not result in the relatively automatic,
class-based findings that New Zealand’s reliance on privacy al-
lows.  In our view, it nonetheless affords a more secure means
by which to establish the “serious harm” limb of the “being
persecuted” requirement for at least those gay applicants most
severely impacted by concealment of their sexual identity.
B. Psychological Harm
The view that psychological harm constitutes cognizable
persecutory harm sits comfortably with international human
rights law jurisprudence, and with the domestic jurisprudence
Comm., General Comment No. 18: Non-Discrimination, ¶ 13, in Compila-
tion of General Comments, supra note 68, at 146. See generally Jason Pobjoy,
Treating Like Alike: The Principle of Non-Discrimination as a Tool to Mandate the
Equal Protection of Refugee and Beneficiaries of Complementary Protection, 34 MELB.
U. L. REV. 181 (2010).  For a discussion on this deferential practice of the
Human Rights Committee, see JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFU-
GEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 129–47 (2005).
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of courts in the common law world.  Moreover, it is surely intu-
itively right that the “menacing implications” that self-repres-
sion will likely have on the psyche are legitimately the concern
of refugee law.160
To illustrate this point, it may be useful to return to the
somewhat laden example of Anne Frank.  The most obvious
risk here is the threat of “exogenous” harm at the hands of the
Nazi Gestapo: deportation to the concentration camp, and the
gas chamber. But it is equally clear that indefinite confine-
ment in the attic will itself likely give rise to serious “endoge-
nous” harm, as a passage from The Diary of a Young Girl, docu-
menting Anne’s “depths of despair,” makes clear161:
The atmosphere is stifling, sluggish, leaden.  Outside,
you don’t hear a single bird, and a deathly, oppres-
sive silence hangs over the house and clings to me as
if it were going to drag me into the deepest regions
of the underworld.  At times like these, Father,
Mother and Margot don’t matter to me in the least.  I
wander from room to room, climb up and down the
stairs and feel like a songbird whose wings have been
ripped off and who keeps hurling itself against the
bars of its dark cage.  “Let me out, where there’s
fresh air and laughter!” a voice within me cries.  I
don’t even bother to reply any more, but lie down on
the divan.  Sleep makes the silence and the terrible
fear go by more quickly, helps pass the time, since it’s
impossible to kill it.162
Considering this scenario, Justice Madgwick in Win observed
that “[even] if the Tribunal were satisfied that the possibility of
her being discovered was remote, she would be sent back to
live in the attic.  It is inconceivable that the framers of the
Convention did have, or should be imputed to have, such a
160. Justices McHugh and Kirby observed in S395 that “it is the threat of
serious harm with its menacing implications that constitutes the persecutory
conduct.” Appellant  S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Af-
fairs (S395) (2003) 216 CLR 473, 490 (Austl.).  This passage is referred to
with approval in the judgment of Sir John Dyson in HJ and HT.  HJ (Iran) v.
Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t (HJ and HT), [2010] UKSC 31, [116],
[2011] 1 A.C. 596, 658 (appeal taken from Eng. & Wales C.A.).
161. FRANK, supra note 130, at 153. R
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result in contemplation.”163  Indeed, assuming the risk of cap-
ture by the Nazis was remote (though history provides clear
evidence of the contrary) the risk associated with indefinite
confinement in the attic was clearly established.  Even if Anne
Frank did not have a well-founded fear of deportation to
prison camps and the gas chamber, she would still have a well-
founded fear of endogenous harm, namely the psychological
harm occasioned by the permanent state of confinement.
Concealing an aspect of one’s identity, including desisting
from an activity sufficiently connected to that identity, may
give rise to psychological harm.  In RG (Colombia),164 the appli-
cant testified that, for him, self-repression “would be to die.”165
A psychiatric expert confirmed that the suppression of sexual
identity for the applicant would be “likely to have traumatic
effects.”166  Similarly, in MK (Lesbians),167 the U.K. tribunal
heard evidence from a psychiatrist that a lesbian’s attempt to
suppress her sexual identity would be “a very potent factor
contributing further to her deterioration.”168  The expert con-
sidered that “suppressing sexual identity meant living as some-
one whom you were not, which resulted in an anxiety increase,
163. Win v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 132,
[18] (Austl.).  In HJ (Iran) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2009]
EWCA (Civ) 172, [10], [2009] Imm. A.R. 600 (appeal taken from Asylum &
Immigr. Trib.) (U.K.), counsel for HJ referred the Court of Appeal to what
he labeled the “Anne Frank principle.”  Lord Justice Pill responded that
what Mr Raza Husain has described as the Anne Frank principle . . .
is not disputed in this appeal.  It would have be no defence to a
claim that Anne Frank faced well-founded fear of persecution in
1942 to say that she was safe in a comfortable attic.  Had she left the
attic, a human activity she could reasonably be expected to enjoy,
her Jewish identity would have led to her persecution.  Refugee sta-
tus cannot be denied by expecting a person to conceal aspects of
identity or suppress behaviour the person should be allowed to ex-
press.
Id.  For discussion of the “Anne Frank principle” on appeal, see HJ and HT,
[2010] UKSC 31, [96], [106], [117]–[118], [2011] 1 A.C. at 653 (Lord
Walker), 655 (Lord Collins), 658 (Lord Dyson).
164. RG (Colom.) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2006] EWCA
(Civ) 57 (appeal taken from Asylum & Immigr. Trib.) (U.K.).
165. Id. [17].
166. Id.
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paranoia and disassociation.”169  More recently, in the case of
SW (Lesbians) the U.K. tribunal heard evidence that the appli-
cant suffered “clinical depression and stress” in Jamaica, “the
reason for which she was unable to disclose to her male doc-
tor.”170
Traditional refugee law doctrine allows such endogenous
harm to be taken into account in the assessment of whether
there is a risk of “being persecuted.”  Drawing on the acknowl-
edged link between serious harm and threats to core norms of
international human rights law,171 article 7 of the ICCPR, one
of the few absolute rights in that treaty, provides a critical
benchmark.  It prohibits not only torture, but also “cruel, in-
human or degrading treatment or punishment.”172
The range of actions encompassed by the notion of cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment has been said to be as “ex-
169. Id. [68].
170. SW v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t (SW Lesbians), [2011] UKUT
00251 (IAC), [33].  In cross-examination the applicant stated: “She would
not contemplate changing her open lesbianism to avoid harm, wherever she
lived.  She was ‘out’ now: being discreet had made her ill with depression
and she had no intention of risking that again.” Id. [20].  The tribunal (ap-
propriately) accepted the applicant’s testimony that she would not conceal
her sexuality if returned to Jamaica and held that she had a well-founded
fear of physical harm as a result of that decision. Id. [120]–[123].  It was
therefore unnecessary for the tribunal to consider whether the clinical de-
pression might itself amount to serious harm.
171. See supra note 18. R
172. “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment or punishment.  In particular, no one shall be subjected with-
out his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.” ICCPR, supra
note 147, art. 7.  Article 3 of the ECHR, supra note 148, and article 5 of the R
American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123,
contain similar provisions.  Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for
signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT], provides that
each State Party “shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its juris-
diction any other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment which do not amount to torture as defined in article 1.” See generally
SARAH JOSEPH ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND COMMENTARY 218–223 (2d ed., 2004); NO-
WAK, supra note 146, at 157–192; NIHAL JAYAWICKRAMA, THE JUDICIAL APPLICA- R
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tensive as the ingenuity of perpetrators,”173 with formal recog-
nition by UN supervisory bodies that both physical and psycho-
logical harm are relevant.  General Comment No. 20 of the
Human Rights Committee codifies the view that the proscrip-
tion in article 7 relates “not only to acts that cause physical
pain, but also to acts that cause mental suffering to the vic-
tim.”174  This proposition finds support in the jurisprudence of
the Committee, which makes clear that cruel and inhuman
treatment encompasses psychological harm, irrespective of
whether physical injury was sustained.175
For example, in Quinteros v. Uruguay, the Committee de-
termined that the mental anguish caused to a mother by the
mysterious disappearance of her daughter amounted to a vio-
lation of article 7:
[There was] anguish and stress caused to the mother
by the disappearance of her daughter and by the con-
tinuing uncertainty concerning her fate and wherea-
bouts.  The [mother] has the right to know what has
happened to her daughter.  In these respects, she too
is a victim of the violation of the Covenant suffered
by her daughter in particular, of article 7.176
Similar conclusions were reached in Schedko v. Belarus and
Staselovich v. Belarus.177  The Committee has also recognized
173. NIGEL RODLEY, THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW 140 (2009).
174. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No 20: Article 7
(Prohibition of Torture, or Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment), ¶ 5, in Compilation of General Comments, supra note 68, at R
129.
175. See JOSEPH ET AL, supra note 172, at 218–23; Hathaway & Hicks, supra R
note 102, at 556–60. The jurisprudence of the U.N. Committee Against Tor- R
ture provides further support for this proposition. See, e.g., Osmani v. Repub-
lic of Serbia, Commc’n No. 261/2005, ¶ 10.3, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/42/D/
261/2005 (May 25, 2009) (considering both physical and mental suffering in
evaluating whether the state party violated the CAT).
176. Quinteros Almaeida v. Uruguay, Commc’n No. 107/1981, ¶ 14,U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/19/D/107/1981 (July 21, 1983).
177. In Schedko v. Belarus, Commc’n No. 886/1999, ¶ 10.2 U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/77/D/886/1999 (Apr. 3, 2003), the Committee recognized the
“continued anguish and mental stress caused to the author [the mother of a
condemned prisoner] by the persisting uncertainty of the circumstances that
led to his execution, as well as the location of his gravesite.”  A similar result
was reached in Staselovich v. Belarus, Commc’n No. 887/1999, ¶ 9.2, U.N.
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the mental harm occasioned by incarceration. In N’goya v.
Zaire178 the Committee found, in circumstances where a state
had abducted someone and refused to allow any outside con-
tact, “the removal of the victim and the prevention of contact
with his family and with the outside world constitute cruel and
inhuman treatment, in violation of article 7 of the Cove-
nant.”179  Similarly, in C v. Australia180 the Committee consid-
ered that a violation of article 7 had occurred where immigra-
tion detention (under Australia’s mandatory detention policy
for unauthorized “asylum-seekers”) has resulted in the devel-
opment of a serious mental illness.181
Critically, in considering whether the substantive harm
feared amounts to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, it
is necessary to consider the circumstances and susceptibilities
of the particular applicant.182  While the standards of interna-
tional human rights law are, of course, universal, this does not
mean that their application is in any sense insensitive to the
specific vulnerabilities of particular persons.  To the contrary,
the prohibition of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment fo-
cuses on the nature of the harm experienced by each individ-
ual, requiring attention to be paid not just to what harm is
threatened, but also to how that harm would impact the appli-
cant himself.  In Vuolanne v. Finland, the Human Rights Com-
mittee expressly affirmed that the meaning of article 7 de-
pends on “all the circumstances of the case, such as the dura-
tion and manner of the treatment, its physical or mental
effects as well as the sex, age and state of health of the vic-
tim.”183  The European Court of Human Rights, interpreting
the regional cognate right, has similarly recognized the need
178. N’goya v Zaire (Democratic Republic of Congo), Commc’n No. 542/
1993, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/56/D/S42/1993 (Apr. 16, 1996).
179. Id. ¶ 5.5.
180. C v. Australia, Commc’n No. 900/1999, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/76/D/
900/1999 (Nov. 13, 2002).
181. Id. ¶¶ 8.4–8.5; see also Vuolanne v. Finland, Commc’n No. 265/1987,
¶ 9.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/35/D/265/1987 (May 2, 1989) (recognizing that
non-physical harm may violate article 7).
182. This doctrine is well-established in international human rights juris-
prudence. See generally Hathaway & Hicks, supra note 102, at 545–46. R
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to consider “the age, sex, and health condition of the person
exposed to [the treatment].”184
This insight from international human rights law aligns
neatly with a growing number of refugee law decisions that
recognize endogenous harm as persecutory.  The jurispru-
dence demonstrates that the proposition that we are advanc-
ing is not novel; there is already emerging support in a range
of contexts for the view that psychological harm is appropri-
ately understood to be persecutory under the Refugee Con-
vention.
The first group of cases involves applicants not themselves
at risk of exogenous harm, but who are related to someone
who is clearly facing serious harm.  As the English Court of
Appeal has held, “[i]t is possible to persecute a husband or a
member of a family by what you do to other members of his
immediate family.”185  This issue has been helpfully elabo-
rated, particularly in decisions from the United States.
184. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R.25, 109 (1978).  This ap-
proach has also been imported into refugee law. See, e.g., EU Qualification
Directive, supra note 33, art. 10(2) (“In assessing an applicant’s fear of being R
persecuted or exposed to other serious and unjustified harm, Member States
shall take into account . . . the individual position and personal circum-
stances of the applicant, including factors such as background, gender, age,
health and disabilities so as to assess the seriousness of persecution or
harm.”). The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has also
recognized that “[H]armful actions against adults that might be considered
as mere harassment or discrimination in the case of an adult may constitute
persecution when applied to children.  Mansour v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 667,
679–80 (9th Cir. 2004) (Pregerson J., dissenting); see also Liu v. Ashcroft, 380
F.3d 307, 314 (7th Cir. 2004) (acknowledging that the fear threshold for
persecution is lower in children than in adults).  In R. v. Special Adjudicator
(Hoxha), [2005] 1 W.L.R. 1063, 1072, [2005] UKHL 19, [34] (appeal taken
from Eng. & Wales C.A.), Baroness Hale of the United Kingdom House of
Lords considered that gender may be relevant in determining whether a
particular action does, or does not, amount to a risk or being persecuted.
185. Katrinak v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2001] EWCA (Civ)
832, [21] (Shiemann L.J.) (appeal taken from Immigr. Appeal Trib.) (U.K.).
There is general acceptance in the United Kingdom context that “being per-
secuted” extends beyond physical harm. See R v. Immigration Appeal Tribu-
nal (Ravichandran), [1995] EWCA (Civ) 16, [1996] Imm. A.R. 97, (appeal
taken from Immigr. Appeal Trib.) (U.K.) (“I cannot think that the loss of
freedom involved would properly be held insufficient to constitute persecu-
tion”); R v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t (Sasitharan), [1998] Imm. A.R.
487 (appeal taken from Immigr. Appeal Trib.) (U.K.) (“[T]he Special Adju-
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In the case of Abay,186 the mother of a girl who faced the
risk of female genital mutilation argued that she, the mother,
qualified independently for refugee status on the grounds of
the psychological trauma that she would face if forced to try to
shield her daughter from female genital mutilation in Ethio-
pia.  The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit accepted that
argument:
[There is] . . . a governing principle in favor of refu-
gee status in cases where a parent and protector is
faced with exposing her child to the clear risk of be-
ing subjected against her will to a practice that is a
form of physical torture causing grave and perma-
nent harm.  Given the evidence . . . that Abay herself
underwent the procedure at a young age; that Abay’s
mother has already attempted to mutilate Abay’s
older daughters, who still faced that prospect upon
their marriage; that Abay would not be able to over-
ride any of her daughters’ future husbands or in-law’s
wishes; and that the government of Ethiopia does
not, as a practical matter, enforce laws intended to
curb traditional practices, we conclude that Abay’s
fear of taking her daughter into the lion’s den of fe-
male genital mutilation in Ethiopia and being forced
to witness the pain and suffering of her daughter is
persecution, but that there is an open ended category of forms of conduct
capable of amounting to persecution, to be evaluated in the light of the
Convention from case to case.”) (emphasis added).  We have seen a similar
acceptance in the Australian Federal Court in SCAT v Minister for Immigration
& Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 80, [23] (Madgwick & Conti
JJ) (“Insofar as psychological harm to the appellant’s family members, rather
than directly to himself, might have been in issue, that could plainly be taken
into account as an element of harm to the appellant himself.  To harm a child
may also be to harm its custodial parents.”) (emphasis added).  In the more
recent case, NBLB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2005]
FCA 1051, the Australian Federal Court was more equivocal. In that case the
applicant stated that he would “go crazy” if returned to South Korea—specif-
ically, the applicant claimed that harm to his family would constitute the
persecution of the applicant, because he would be personally affected by
that punishment.  The Federal Court found that fear of psychological harm
was not well-founded, irrespective of whether that could constitute persecu-
tion. Id. [80]–[82]; see also SBTF v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship
[2007] FCA 1816, [48] (Austl.) (citing SCAT, [2003] FCA 80, to support the
appellant’s contention that psychological harm may be serious harm).
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well-founded.  Accordingly, we find that Abay is also a
“refugee” within the meaning of the Act.187
This approach was approved by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals in the 2010 decision of Kone v. Holder188: “[T]he
Board may consider on remand whether the mental anguish
of a mother who was herself a victim of genital mutilation who
faces the choice of seeing her daughter suffer the same fate, or
avoiding that outcome by separation from her child, may qual-
ify as such ‘other serious harm.’”189
187. Id. at 642.  We note, however, that this approach is not boundless.
Compare this to the more recent decision from the Sixth Circuit where a
female Pakistani applicant unsuccessfully invoked her husband’s politically
inspired imprisonment for 15 days as amounting to persecution of her.  Sul-
tana v. Holder, 350 F. App’x 59, 61 (6th Cir. 2009).  This caution sensibly
derives from the recognition that there has to be some serious harm (exoge-
nous or endogenous) vicariously inflicted on the applicant himself or herself
rather than invoking what amounts to a purely derivative harm.
188. Kone v. Holder, 496 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2010).
189. Id. at 153; see also Benyamin v. Holder, 579 F.3d 970, 975 (9th Cir.
2009) (utilizing the same approach).  Note, however, the First Circuit and
Fourth Circuit have expressly rejected this approach, making the unquali-
fied assertion that “ ‘persecution’ cannot be based on a fear of psychological
harm alone.”  Niang v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 505, 512 (4th Cir. 2007);
Kechichian v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 15, 22 (1st Cir. 2008); see also In re A-K-, 24 I.
& N. Dec. 275, 278 (B.I.A. 2007) (“[A]llowing an applicant to obtain asylum
or withholding of removal through persecution to his child would require
granting relief outside the statutory . . . scheme established by Congress.”).
A similar argument has been advanced by spouses and partners of women
subjected to forced sterilization or abortion.  Applicants have referred to the
“devastation” caused by a spouse’s forced sterilization, Xueqieng Lin v. U.S.
Att’y Gen., 337 F. App’x 278, 280 (3d Cir. 2010), and the “severe emotional
harm” caused by the loss of the “right to have more children,” Liang Chen v.
U.S. Att’y Gen., 396 F. App’x 891, 893 (3d Cir. 2010).  United States appellate
courts have recognized the possibility of a claim grounded in psychological
harm in this context, though in the majority of cases the courts have consid-
ered that the purported emotional distress did not reach the requisite
threshold.  Id. at 893–94; Chang Hao Lin-Lin v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 360 F. App’x
392, 394–95 (3d Cir. 2010); Xueqieng Lin, 337 F. App’x at 280; Guang Lin-
Zheng v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 557 F.3d 147, 157 (3d Cir. 2009); In re J-S-, 24 I. &
N. Dec. 520, 543 (B.I.A. 2008). Cf. Zi Zhi Tang v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 987,
992 (9th Cir. 2007) (concluding that those who have undergone forced ster-
ilization and abortion are entitled to withholding of removal); Qu v. Gonza-
les, 399 F.3d 1195, 1203 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Involuntary sterilization irrevoca-
bly strips persons of one of the important liberties we possess as humans: our
reproductive freedom.  Therefore, one who has suffered involuntary sterili-
zation, either directly or because of the sterilization of a spouse, is entitled,
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The second group of cases recognizing the plausibility of
endogenous forms of persecution involves claims where the
applicant suffered psychological harm as a consequence of
threats of violence or murder.  As one decision maker noted,
“fear, by its nature, obviously had implications for the
psyche.”190  In a recent decision, the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit stated:
Threats alone, and particularly threats of death, can
amount to persecution under certain circumstances.
In [Mitev, 67 F.3d at 1331], we considered the possi-
bility that living under threat of death by secret gov-
ernment forces might rise to this level . . . . To live,
day after day, knowing that government forces might secretly
arrest and execute you is itself a form of mental anguish that
can constitute persecution.  Yet, logic dictates that for an
unfulfilled threat to rise to the level of persecution, it
must be something extraordinarily ominous.  It can-
not simply be a threat of death that, in context, is just
a matter of words.191
Various references to “threats” as relevant harms are evident
also in the jurisprudence concerning sexual orientation.  In
Guan,192 the Court considered that the applicants were living
“at the level of furtiveness and fear brought about by the intol-
erance of the State.”193  In Karouni, the United States Court of
607 (B.I.A. 2003) (“The act of forced sterilization should not be viewed as a
discreet onetime act, comparable to a term in prison, or an incident of se-
vere beating or even torture.  Coerced sterilization is better viewed as a per-
manent and continuing act of persecution that has deprived a couple of the
natural fruits of conjugal life, and the society and comfort of the child or
children that might eventually have been born to them.”).
190. SBTF [2007] FCA 1816, [29] (quoting SBTF v Minister for Immigration
&Citizenship [2007] FMCA 1142, [58] (Austl.)).
191. Pathmakanthan v. Holder, 612 F.3d 618, 623 (7th Cir. 2010) (empha-
sis added).  The Ninth Circuit has also opened the door to the possibility
that in extreme cases the risk of threats as such might be a risk of being
persecuted. See Rios v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding
repeated death threats a sufficient basis to establish persecution); Lim v.
I.N.S., 70 F. App’x 68, 71 (9th Cir. 2000) (“To effect a well-founded fear, a
threat need not be statistically more than fifty-percent likely . . . .”), cited with
approval in Ramos Ortiz v. Ashcroft, 70 F. App’x 68 (3d Cir. 2003).
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Appeals for the Ninth Circuit accepted that the applicant’s life
was “intolerable” and that he “was living in fear every moment
of [his] life.”194  Such references resonate with the words of
Kirby and McHugh JJ in S395 that “it is the threat of serious
harm with its menacing implications that constitutes the persecu-
tory conduct.”195
A third group of cases involves applicants who have suf-
fered psychological harm because of ongoing discrimination.
The case of SCAT was the adjudication of a claim brought by a
member of the Sabean Mandean religious minority from Iran.
The essence of the case was that members of the minority
faced widespread and pervasive discrimination.  For example,
they were regularly called “dirty Sabeans” by the majority Mus-
lim population, were denied the right to handle food, were
not touched in physical greetings, were excluded from clubs,
their religion was denigrated, and women were frequently
forced into marriages with Muslim men.  The Federal Court of
Australia considered that the cumulative effect of prolonged
discrimination “was likely to entail severe psychological
harm”196:
If people are, from an early age, considered by the
great majority of the people in the society in which
they live too be “dirty,” are positively treated as if they
are dirty, and if there is otherwise widespread and far-
reaching discrimination against them, it requires no
degree in psychology to accept that this may well be
very harmful to mental well-being.197
To similar effect, in R (Hoxha), the House of Lords gave weight
to the psychological risk of returning one of the female appli-
cants—a Kosovar Albanian woman who had been raped by
194. Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163, 1168 (9th Cir. 2005).
195. Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs
(S395) (2003) 216 CLR 473, 490 (McHugh & Kirby JJ) (Austl.) (emphasis
added).
196. SCAT v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs
[2003] FCA 80, [23] (Austl.).
197. Id. [21], cited with approval in SBTF v Minister for Immigration & Citizen-
ship [2007] FCA 1816, [48] (Austl.).  For an application of SCAT and SBTF,
see S2012 of 2003 v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2008] FMCA
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Serbian forces.198  Baroness Hale suggested that the risk of
continued and severe stigma could, at least in a severe case,
amount to a risk of being persecuted, even where there was no
longer any real chance of the rape itself being repeated:
To suffer the insult and indignity of being regarded
by one’s own community . . . as “dirty like contami-
nated” because one has suffered the gross ill-treat-
ment of a particularly brutal and dehumanizing rape
. . . is the very sort of cumulative denial of human
dignity which to my mind is capable of amounting to
persecution.199
A fourth and final group of cases—of particular salience
to gay persons opting for self-repression—concerns applicants
who have suffered psychological harm as a consequence of the
modification of behavior.  There has been some recognition in
domestic courts that the psychological harm occasioned by
concealing a protected identity or desisting from a protected
activity might give rise to a cognizable risks for the purposes of
the “being persecuted” inquiry.  As already noted, the English
Court of Appeal in HJ and HT determined that psychological
harm in these circumstances could amount to a risk of being
persecuted.200  This characterization of harm has also found
198. R v. Special Adjudicator (Hoxha), [2005] UKHL 19, [87] (appeal
taken from Eng. & Wales C.A.).
199. Id. [36].  Although in this case Baroness Hale relied on the more
ambiguous notion of ‘dignity’, rather than the more concrete cruel, inhu-
man or degrading treatment standard, the latter would easily have embraced
the relevant harms.  In Chan v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1989)
169 CLR 379, 430–31, McHugh J stated: “Other forms of harm short of inter-
ference with life or liberty may constitute ‘persecution’ for the purposes of
the Convention and Protocol.  Measures ‘in disregard’ of human dignity
may, in appropriate cases, constitute persecution . . . .”  For a similar discus-
sion in the New Zealand context, see Refugee Appeal No. 71404/99, 29 Oct.
1999, at paras [67], [74], available at http://www.refugee.org.nz/
Casesearch/Fulltext/71404-99.htm.
200. See supra text accompanying note 123.  In doing so, the Court of Ap- R
peal followed its earlier authority in Z v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t,
[2004] EWCA (Civ) 1578, [2005] Imm. A.R. 75 (appeal taken from Immigr.
Appeal Trib.) (U.K.); J v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2006] EWCA
(Civ) 1238, [2007] Imm. A.R. 73 (appeal taken from Asylum & Immigr.
Trib.) (U.K.); Amare v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2005] EWCA
(Civ) 1600, [2006] Imm. A.R. 217 (appeal taken from Immigr. Appeal Trib.)
(U.K.); RG (Colom.) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2006] EWCA
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some traction in the United States.  In the case of Fatin,201 the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit posited, albeit “for the
sake of argument” only, that requiring some women to wear
chadors may be so abhorrent to them that it would satisfy the
“being persecuted” threshold:
[T]he concept of persecution is broad enough to in-
clude governmental measures that compel an indi-
vidual to engage in conduct that is not physically
painful or harmful but is abhorrent to that individ-
ual’s deepest beliefs.  An example of such conduct
might be requiring a person to renounce his or her
religious beliefs or to desecrate an object of religious
importance.202
This suggestion was subsequently taken up and emphatically
endorsed in Fisher.203  In that case, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit considered it “clear that being forced to con-
form to, or being sanctioned for failing to comply with, a con-
ception of Islam that fundamentally is at odds with one’s own
. . . can rise to the level of persecution.”204
These four categories of refugee cases in which endoge-
nous, psychological harm is recognized as persecutory align
neatly with the jurisprudence of international human rights
tribunals interpreting “cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment” as including serious psychological harm.  Moreover,
there is reason to believe that the torment of self-repression
that would await the applicants in both S395 and HJ and HT
(recall the Bangladeshi applicants’ reference to being “cap-
tives in our homeland” and the Iranian applicant’s insistence
that it was “impossible” for him to return to his country) is very
(U.K.); and  XY (Iran) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2008] EWCA
(Civ) 911 (appeal taken from Asylum & Immigr. Trib.) (U.K.).  In Z v. Sec’y
of State for the Home Dep’t, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1578, [15], Buxton LJ (with
whom Jacob LJ and Peter Gibson LJ agreed) stated that “[The] case only
falls under the Refugee Convention if it results in a condition that can prop-
erly be called persecutory, in that it imposes on the subject a state of mind or
conscience that fits with the definition of persecution . . . .” (emphasis added).
See RG (Colom.), [2006] EWCA (Civ) 57, [16] (noting that “the high level of
distress that must be reached before a denial of freedom can be said to be
persecutory.”).
201. Fatin v. I.N.S, 12 F.3d 1233 (3d Cir. 1993).
202. Id. at 1242.
203. Fisher v I.N.S., 37 F.3d 1371 (9th Cir. 1994).
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much in line with refugee jurisprudence that has recognized
persecution to be established on the basis of the psychological
harm following from threats of violence, in consequence of
ongoing discrimination and, most especially, that occasioned
by desisting from a protected activity related to one’s identity.
It would have been a straightforward matter205 for the courts
to reach the same result without finding that there was a genu-
ine risk of (an exogenous) harm that would not actually ac-
crue.
III. DOES RISK FOLLOWING FROM BEHAVIOR WARRANT
REFUGEE STATUS?
The courts in S395 and HJ and HT unequivocally acknowl-
edged that risk for reasons of one’s sexual identity falls squarely
within the Convention’s requirement that the well-founded
fear of being persecuted be causally connected to one of the
five nexus grounds, specifically “membership of a particular
sexual group.”206  In S395, the Australian High Court affirmed
the primary tribunal’s finding that homosexual men in Ban-
gladesh constitute a “particular social group” for the purpose
of the Convention,207 with Justices McHugh and Kirby going
so far as to say that a contrary finding would “arguably have
been perverse.”208  The United Kingdom Supreme Court took
the same tack, with Lord Hope observing that there is “no
doubt that gay men and women may be considered to be a par-
205. Of course, we acknowledge that this approach may raise evidential
issues; particularly in regard to the nature of the evidence to be adduced to
satisfy the requisite threshold.  In this regard, it is important to recall that
the most fundamental principle governing the fact-finding process in refu-
gee claims is that the responsibility to seek out and present objective evi-
dence of risk is shared by the person seeking protection, and the state to
which the asylum request is addressed. See UNHCR Handbook, supra note
101, ¶ 196 (“[W]hile the burden of proof in principle rests on the applicant, R
the duty to ascertain and evaluate all the relevant facts is shared between the
applicant and the examiner.  Indeed, in some cases, it may be for the exam-
iner to use all means at his disposal to produce the necessary evidence in
support of the applicant.”).
206. See supra text accompanying note 34. R
207. Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs
(S395) (2003) 216 CLR 473, 494 (McHugh & Kirby JJ), 497 (Hayne & Gum-
mow JJ) (Austl.).
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ticular social group”209 since “[t]he group is defined by the
immutable characteristic of its members’ sexual orientation or
sexuality.”210  It is thus clear that if the risk accrues for reason
of sexual identity per se—for example, the applicant fears that
he will be arrested and imprisoned because of legislation
criminalizing homosexuality, or will not openly identify him-
self as gay because he fears that he will be deprived of the abil-
ity to earn a livelihood if he does—then the nexus require-
ment is satisfied.211
Equally important, both courts also affirmed that risk for
reasons of imputed identity satisfies the nexus criterion as easily
as risk that follows from actual identity. In HJ and HT, Lord
Rodger stated that
[w]hen an applicant applies for asylum on the
ground of a well-founded fear of persecution because
209. HJ (Iran) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t (HJ and HT), [2010]
UKSC 31, [10], [2011] 1 A.C. 596, 620 (appeal taken from Eng. & Wales
C.A.) (emphasis added).  Both Lord Hope and Lord Rodger also refer to the
Refugee or Person in Need of International Protection (Qualification) Reg-
ulations, 2006, S.I. 2006/2525, ¶ 6(1)(e) (U.K.), in support of this proposi-
tion.
210. HJ and HT, [2010] UKSC 31, [11], [2011] 1 A.C. at 621.
211. Significantly, only one of the “serious harm” or the “failure of state
protection” needs to be causally connected to the protected interest.  Islam
v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t (Shah), [1999] UKHL 20, [1999] 2 A.C.
629, 653–54 (Lord Hoffmann).  The House of Lords reasoned in Shah that if
the risk of “being persecuted” is the sum of two facts—the threat of serious
harm and the failure of state protection—that summative concept is logically
“for reasons of” a Convention ground if either of the two essential elements
is “for reasons of” a Convention ground. Id.  In Lord Hoffmann’s oft-cited
formulation:
[S]uppose that the Nazi government . . . did not actively organize
violence against the Jews subjected to violence by neighbors.  A Jew-
ish shopkeeper is attacked by a gang organized by an Aryan com-
petitor . . . . The competitor and his gang are motivated by business
rivalry and the desire to settle old personal scores . . . . Is he being
persecuted on grounds of race? . . . [I]n my opinion, he is.  An
essential element in the persecution, the failure by the authorities
to provide protection, is based upon race.  It is true that one answer
to the question “why was he attacked?” would be “because a com-
petitor wanted to drive him out of business.”  But another answer,
and in my view the right answer in the context of the Convention,
would be “he was attacked by a competitor who knew he would
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he is gay, the tribunal must first ask itself whether it is
satisfied on the evidence that he is gay, or that he
would be treated as gay by potential persecutors in his coun-
try of nationality.212
Similarly, in S395, Justices McHugh and Kirby noted the need
to establish the “existence of a causal relationship between the
harm feared and one or more of the characteristics or attrib-
utes, real or imputed, of the social group.”213
Beyond well-founded fear of being persecuted that is
grounded in actual or imputed identity, the courts in S395 and
HJ and HT also recognized that the nexus requirement can be
satisfied where risk accrues not simply by reason of identity,
but in response to at least some activities connected to the pro-
tected identity.  In S395, Justices Gummow and Hayne made
clear that
[s]exual identity is not to be understood . . . as con-
fined to particular sexual acts or, indeed, to any par-
ticular forms of physical conduct. It may, and often
will, extend to many aspects of human relationships
and activity.  That two individuals engage in sexual
acts in private (and in that sense “discreetly”) may say
nothing about how those individuals would choose to
live other aspects of their lives that are related to, or
informed by, their sexuality . . . .214
And in HJ and HT, Lord Hope stated:
[Sexual orientation] is a characteristic that may be re-
vealed, to a greater or lesser degree, by the way the
members of this group behave.  In that sense, be-
cause it manifests itself in behaviour, it is less immedi-
ately visible than a person’s race.  But unlike a per-
son’s religion or political opinion, it is incapable of
being changed.  To pretend that it does not exist, or
that the behaviour by which it manifests itself can be
suppressed, is to deny the members of this group
their fundamental right to be what they are.215
212. HJ and HT, [2010] UKSC 31, [82], [2011] 1 A.C. at 647 (emphasis
added).
213. S395 (2003) 216 CLR at 486 (emphasis added).
214. Id. at 500–01.
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By reason of the strong link between the Refugee Conven-
tion’s nexus clause and non-discrimination law, described be-
low,216 the courts were quite right to reject the rigid “is/does”
dichotomy.  Indeed, Lord Rodger’s insistence that the scope
of protected activity goes beyond that necessary to “enable the
applicant to attract sexual partners and establish and maintain
relationships with them”217 is surely right.  There is, however, a
critical distinction between recognizing that a meaningful un-
derstanding of non-discrimination norms as the bedrock of
the nexus requirement requires attention to action-based risks,
and the position suggested in S395 and HJ and HT that there
are no limits to which action-based risks are relevant.  In both
cases, the possibility that at least some forms of behavior
loosely (or stereotypically218) associated with homosexuality
are not presently protected at law was ignored.  The open-en-
ded formulation of relevant actions adopted by the High
Court of Australia219 and, in particular, the all-embracing for-
mulation advanced by Lord Rodger in the United Kingdom
Supreme Court—which crescendos with a passage outlining
what he believes it means to “live freely and openly as a gay
man” (a life of Kylie concerts, exotically coloured cocktails and
“boy talk” with straight female friends220), suggesting that “gay
men are to be as free as their straight equivalents in the society
concerned to live their lives in the way that is natural to them
as gay men”221—seem to assume that  risk following from any
“gay” form of behavior gives rise to refugee status.
Yet, this all-inclusive approach to identifying which ac-
tions are appropriately deemed to be included within the pro-
tected status of sexual orientation really cannot be reconciled
to the accepted view that the Refugee Convention’s benefici-
ary class is delimited.  In defining the approach to interpreta-
216. See infra text accompanying notes 224–231. R
217. HJ and HT, [2010] UKSC 31, [78], [2011] 1 A.C. at 645–46.
218. Lord Rodger himself admits this. Id. [78], [2011] 1 A.C. at 646.
219. In S395, Gummow and Hayne JJ rejected the suggestion that any line
between protected and other activity should be drawn, asserting that “the
tribunal has no jurisdiction or power to require anyone to do anything in
the country of nationality . . . .” S395 (2003) 216 CLR at 501.  They contin-
ued to say that “considering what an individual is entitled to do is of little
assistance . . . .” in the assessment of refugee status. Id. at 502.
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tion of the “membership of a particular social group” ground,
the High Court of Australia held in the seminal case of Appli-
cant A222 that, “if [the drafters] had intended to provide a
‘catch-all . . . ,’ it is more likely than not that they would have
amended the draft treaty by eliminating the specific grounds
of persecution.”223  Having instead inserted a delimiting
clause—that only risks of being persecuted “for reasons of”
one of five grounds would give rise to refugee status—the
need to grapple with the scope of that delimitation is unavoid-
able.  Yet, the decisions in S395 and HJ and HT essentially re-
fuse to confront this question in the context of sexual orienta-
tion, thereby ironically resuscitating a version of the “catch-all”
approach to the “social group” ground so emphatically re-
jected by the Australian High Court in Applicant A.
How, then, should the courts have proceeded?  Senior
courts of the common law world have long recognized the
principle of non-discrimination—the core human rights value
of the international system, and arguably a jus cogens
norm224—as the principled reference point for identifying
those interests protected by the Convention’s nexus
grounds.225  In Ward, the Supreme Court of Canada invoked
the principle of ejusdem generis to insist that the amorphous
222. A v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (“Applicant A”) (1997) 190
CLR 225 (Austl.).
223. Id. at 260 (McHugh J).
224. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES § 702 cmt. n (1987) (defining jus cogens to include “systematic racial
discrimination”). See generally HATHAWAY, supra note 158, at 28–31. R
225. In Australia the traditional view has been to conceptualize “particular
social group” by reference to a “social perception” test focusing attention on
the external or outward perception of a group. Applicant A (1997) 190 CLR
225, 300.  Importantly, however, in S395 itself the Australian High Court ef-
fectively adopted a ejusdem generis approach. Appellant S395/2002 v Minister of
Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (S395) (2003) 216 CLR 473, 494.  Indeed,
the Court expressly rejected the view adopted by the Refugee Review Tribu-
nal on the basis of the social perception test that gay men could be divided
into two sub-groups (“discreet” and “non-discreet” homosexuals). Id. at 494.
Yet ironically, even as Australia—home of the “social perception” test—has
impliedly questioned this approach, other jurisdictions have placed greater
weight on the outward perception of a group:
Given the varying approaches, and the protection gaps which
can result, . . . . [t]he two approaches ought to be reconciled. The
protected characteristics [ejusdem generis] approach may be under-
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“membership of a particular social group” category be inter-
preted in consonance with the non-discrimination principle
informing the other four Convention grounds: race, religion,
nationality and political opinion.  Drawing on the reasoning of
the United States Board of Immigration Appeals in Acosta,226
the Canadian Supreme Court considered that the meaning as-
signed to “particular social group” should “take into account
the general underlying themes of the defence of human rights
and anti-discrimination that form the basis for the interna-
tional refugee protection initiative.”227  The Court considered
that anti-discrimination notions inherent in civil and political
rights limited the particular social group category, and that in
distilling the boundaries of that Convention ground it is ap-
propriate to “find inspiration in discrimination concepts.”228
The approach adopted in Acosta and Ward was subse-
quently approved by the House of Lords in Shah.229  In that
case, Lord Hoffmann advanced a test substantively indistin-
guishable from the North American reliance on ejusdem generis:
In my opinion, the concept of discrimination in mat-
ters affecting fundamental rights and freedoms is
central to an understanding of the Convention . . . .
cial perception analysis.  Accordingly, it is appropriate to adopt a
single standard that incorporates both dominant approaches . . . .
. . .
If a claimant alleges a social group that is based on a character-
istic determined to be neither unalterable or fundamental, further
analysis should be undertaken to determine whether the group is
nonetheless perceived as a cognizable group in that society.
U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, “Membership of a Particular Social Group”
Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶¶ 10–13, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/
02/02 (May 7, 2002).  Although the current state of the law thus remains
unclear, decision makers and the UNHCR agree that the ejusdem generis ap-
proach lies at the core of any consideration of “particular social group,” even
if greater weight is now being given to the outward perception of the group.
226. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. 211 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled in part on other
grounds by in re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).  The Canadian
Supreme Court in Ward approved Acosta as reflecting a “classic discrimina-
tion analysis.”  Canada (Att’y Gen.) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 736.
227. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. at 739 (La Forest J.).
228. Id. at 734 (La Forest J.).
229. Islam v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t (Shah), [1999] UKHL 20,
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The obvious examples, based on the experiences of
the persecutions in Europe which would have been
in the minds of the delegates in 1951, were race, re-
ligion, nationality and political opinion.  But the in-
clusion of “particular social group” recognised that
there might be different criteria for discrimination,
in parie materiae with discrimination on other
grounds, which would be equally offensive to human
rights . . . . In choosing to use the general term “par-
ticular social group” rather than an enumeration of
specific social groups, the framers of the Convention
were in my opinion intending to include whatever
groups might be regarded as coming within the anti-
discriminatory objectives of the Convention.230
The invocation of ejusdem generis or, of matters in parie
materiae, is, of course, consistent with accepted principles of
treaty interpretation requiring a decision maker to interpret a
treaty “in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in
light of its object and purpose.”231  Under this understanding,
the textually plain intent to constrain the scope of the Refugee
Convention’s beneficiary class is respected, even as a clear and
compelling basis for that delimitation is established.  But de-
spite the flexibility of this approach, it does not amount to an
invitation to treat international refugee law as an all-encom-
passing remedy.  And if the Convention grounds themselves
are not boundless, on what possible basis can it be suggested
that the scope of protected activity encompassed by such
grounds is without limitation?  If the activity that engenders
230. Id.
231. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, opened for signature
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT] (emphasis added).
The International Court of Justice has pronounced that articles 31 and 32 of
the VCLT constitute customary international law, and therefore apply to the
interpretation of any treaty, irrespective of whether the state parties involved
are parties to the VCLT Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6, 21.
This is important as the VCLT does not technically apply to an interpreta-
tion of the Convention, as both the Refugee Convention and its attendant Proto-
col predate the VCLT. See VCLT, supra, art. 4 (“Without prejudice to the
application of any rules set forth in the present Convention to which treaties
would be subject under international law independently of the Convention,
the Convention applies only to treaties which are concluded by States after
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the risk is intrinsic to one of the five forms of protected status,
then refugee status must, of course, be recognized.  But if the
activity precipitating the risk is no more than marginally con-
nected to one of the forms of protected status, then the ensu-
ing risk of being persecuted cannot reasonably be said to be
“for reasons of” a Convention ground.
The uncontroversial nature of this principle is clear from
the preparedness of the Australian and United Kingdom
courts to limit the scope of protected activities in the context
of claims based on the cognate grounds of religion or political
opinion.  Perhaps the most obvious example of precipitating
actions that cannot be said to give rise to a risk of harm that is
“for reasons of” a protected status are those actions that in-
fringe the rights of others.  In Applicant NABD, a case involving
religious persecution, Justice Kirby of the Australian High
Court stated that
the human rights of the applicant for protection
must be accommodated to the human rights of other
individuals, both in the country of nationality and in
the country in which protection is sought.  Violent,
aggressive or persistently [non-consensual] conduct
“for reasons of . . . religion” are not protected by the
Convention, any more than by other instruments of
international law.232
The position that actions that infringe the rights of others are
not themselves protected is, of course, intrinsic in the very
structure of international human rights law.  In Applicant
NABD, Justice Kirby relied on the language of article 18 of the
ICCPR which makes clear that the right to freedom of religion
is subject to “such limitations as are prescribed by law and are
necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or
the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.”233
But it is by no means clear that only rights-violative actions
are excluded from the ambit of the protected forms of civil or
political status.  To the contrary, at least in religion and politi-
cal opinion cases, courts have been quite prepared to engage
in line-drawing to separate protected from unprotected forms
of activity.  Indeed, in HJ and HT, Lord Hope expressly stated
232. Applicant NABD of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural &
Indigenous Affairs (Applicant NABD) (2005) 216 ALR 1, [113] (Austl.).
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that “where the fear is of persecution for reasons of religion or
political opinion, it may be necessary to examine the nature
and consequences of any activity that the applicant claims he
or she may wish to pursue if returned to the country of nation-
ality.”234  We have seen this approach adopted—at times, with
particular vigor—by the English Court of Appeal.  In a case
involving an Ahmadi from Pakistan determined to propagate
his version of Islam despite its official prohibition and a clear
risk of physical injury, the Court of Appeal held that an appli-
cant may be required to curb religious activity in a country
where it would attract hostility.235  Similarly, the Court of Ap-
peal has held that “standing up for law and order” in a corrupt
system does not fall within the ambit of “political opinion.”236
Drawing a line between protected and unprotected activi-
ties beyond the fairly clear area of actions that infringe the
rights of others is not an easy task.  Indeed, the line drawing of
courts in relation to religion and political opinion of the kind
cited above has at times been problematic.  Why was proselytiz-
ing not found to be protected religious activity?  Why was
standing up for due process in the face of corruption not a
political opinion?  This difficulty is accentuated in the sexual
orientation context where—in contrast to “religion” and “po-
litical opinion” for which the ICCPR offers clear, if nascent,
textual guidance on the scope of protected activities—the ab-
sence of any express mention of sexual orientation in interna-
tional instruments means that guidance must be derived indi-
rectly from the understandings of non-discrimination law, and
international human rights law more generally.
234. HJ (Iran) v Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t (HJ and HT), [2010]
UKSC 31, [17], [2011] 1 A.C. 596, 623 (appeal taken from Eng. & Wales
C.A.)).
235. Ahmad v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [1990] Imm. A.R. 61
(appeal taken from Immigr. Appeal Trib.) (U.K.) (affirming the Court of
Appeal’s earlier decision in Mendis v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t,
[1989] Imm. A.R. 6 (appeal taken from Immigr. Appeal Trib.) (U.K.)).  The
Court of Appeal was careful to acknowledge that there could be no such
constraint on an activity “widely regarded as [a] fundamental human right.”
Id.  The Ahmad decision was distinguished in part in a later case interpret-
ing the internal protection alternative.  Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t v.
Ahmed, [1999] EWCA (Civ) 3003, [2000] INLR 1 (appeal taken from Asy-
lum & Immigr. Trib.) (U.K.).
236. Storozhenko v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2001] EWCA
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For example, the jurisprudence makes clear that there is a
private sphere of protected activity.  The protected interest of
sexual identity includes, at the very least, engaging in sexual
conduct, seeking and maintaining a relationship, and cohab-
iting with a partner.237  There is also clearly a right openly to
identify oneself as a member of a sexual minority,238 and to be
safeguarded from discrimination in relation to such spheres as
securing accommodation,239 undertaking public service,240
237. See Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149, 161 (1981)
(finding that legislation in Northern Ireland prohibiting anal intercourse
interferes with the right to have one’s private life respected); Modinos v.
Cyprus, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 485, 493 (1993) (finding it undisputed that Cyp-
riot legislation criminalizing private consensual homosexual relations was
contrary to the right to privacy found in the ECHR and the Constitution of
the Republic of Cyprus ); Norris v. Ireland,13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 186, 196 (1988)
(finding that even unenforced legislation criminalizing private homosexual
acts infringes on the right to privacy); SL v. Austria, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep 799,
809 (2003) (finding that provisions in the Austrian Criminal Code defining
the age of consent unjustifiably discriminated against homosexual men);
Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1055, 1071 (1999)
(finding that a detrimental child custody decision based on the father’s sex-
ual orientation amounted to a violation of the EHCR); Toonen, supra note
143, ¶ 8.2 (finding it “undisputed that adult consensual activity in private” is R
protected by article 17 of the ICCPR); X v. Colombia, Commc’n No. 1361/
2005, ¶ 7.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/89/D/1361/2005 (May 4, 2007) (finding
Colombia in violation of article 26 of the ICCPR for denying pension bene-
fits to same sex partners); Young v. Australia, Commc’n No. 941/2000, ¶
10.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/941/2000 (Sept. 18, 2003) (finding an Aus-
tralian pension law which granted benefits to opposite sex partners but de-
nied benefits to same sex partners to be a violation of article 26 of the
ICCPR).
238. In these circumstances, the suggestion by the Full Federal Court of
Australia that “public manifestation of homosexuality is not an essential part
of being homosexual” is plainly incorrect. WABR v Minister for Immigration &
Multicultural Affairs (2002) 121 FCR 196, 204.  The non-discrimination
framework is a tool that can assist decision makers in the task of ascertaining
the scope of protected activities in an objective and principled manner. It is
not an invitation for subjective line drawing, divorced from international
standards. For a detailed discussion of the outdated, and at times patently
discriminatory, reasoning adopted by refugee decision makers in attempting
to define the scope of protected activities, see Dauvergne & Millbank, Bur-
dened by Proof, supra note 15; Millbank, supra note 15. R
239. Karner v. Austria, 39 Eur. Ct. H.R. 24 (2004); Kozak v. Poland, App.
No.  13102/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010).
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and engaging in political expression.241  But to this point, the
right to marry242 or adopt children243 has not been recognized
as within the scope of protected activity.  Such understandings
may, of course, change over time as the normative consensus
evolves.244 As Justices Gummow and Hayne insisted in S395,
[s]exual identity is not to be understood in this con-
text as confined to engaging in particular sexual acts
or, indeed, to any particular forms of physical con-
duct.  It may, and often will, extend to many aspects
of human relationships and activity.  That two indi-
viduals engage in sexual acts in private (and in that
sense ‘discreetly’) may say nothing about how those
individuals would choose to live other aspects of their
lives that are related to, or informed by, their sexual-
ity.245
241. Alekseyev v. Russia, App. Nos. 4916/07, 25924/08, 14599/0, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (2010), ¶ 82.
242. Joslin v. New Zealand, Commc’n No. 902/1999, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/
75/D/902/1999 (July 17, 2002) (Human Rights Comm.); Schalk v. Austria,
App. No. 30141/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010).
243. Fretté v. France, 38 Eur. Ct. H.R. 21 (2004).
244. This is clearly shown in the same-sex marriage context, where, even
as the Human Rights Committee and European Court of Human Rights
held that differentiation on grounds of sexual orientation in relation to mar-
riage was reasonable, they indicated that this might well change in the near
future.  In Joslin v. New Zealand, two members of the Committee observed
that “the Committee’s jurisprudence support[ed] the position that such dif-
ferentiation may well, depending on the circumstances of a concrete case,
amount to prohibited discrimination.” Joslin, supra note 242, app.  In Schalk, R
the European Court of Human Rights noted that there was an “emerging
European consensus towards legal recognition of same-sex couples” and that
it was an area to be regarded “as one of evolving rights with no established
consensus.” Schalk, App. No. 30141/04, ¶ 105.
245. Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs
(S395) (2003) 216 CLR 473, 500–01 (Austl.).  The U.K. Supreme Court in
HJ and HT similarly remarked:
At the most basic level, if a male applicant were to live discreetly, he
would in practice have to avoid any open expression of affection
for another man which went beyond what would be acceptable be-
havior on the part of a straight man.  He would have to be cautious
about the friendships he formed, the circle of friends in which he
moved, the places where he socialised.  He would have constantly
to restrain himself in an area of life where powerful emotions and
physical attraction are involved and a straight man could be sponta-
neous, impulsive even.  Not only would he not be able to indulge
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In our view, the protected status of sexual orientation
ought more generally to encompass any activity reasonably re-
quired to reveal or express an individual’s sexual identity.  We
acknowledge, of course, that there can be no single, univer-
sally acceptable definition of such activity,246 and note the im-
portance of ensuring a culturally sensitive and inclusive ap-
proach.  But it remains that there will be some activities at least
loosely associated with sexual identity which, though innocu-
ous and inoffensive, are not reasonably required to reveal or
express an individual’s sexual identity.  Where risk accrues
only by virtue of an applicant having engaged in an activity no
more than peripherally associated with sexual identity—in-
cluding where risk arises from an imputation of sexual identity
derived solely from having engaged in such activity—it cannot
reasonably be said to be a risk that arises “for reasons of” sex-
ual orientation.  In our view, this is likely to include attending
Kylie concerts, drinking multicolored cocktails and engaging
in “boy talk.”
Reliance on international human rights law, of course, de-
nies the possibility of immediate assertion that all activities in
any way associated with sexuality are necessarily protected.  We
nonetheless believe that it affords the most principled basis for
drawing a line between behavior or actions included within a
form of protected civil or political status, and those which are
not.
sexual life, but he would have to think twice before revealing that
he was attracted to another man.  Similarly, the small tokens and
gestures of affection which are taken for granted between men and
women could well be dangerous.  In short, his potential for finding
happiness in some sexual relationship would be profoundly af-
fected.
HJ (Iran) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t (HJ and HT), [2010] UKSC
31, [77], [2011] 1 A.C. 596, 645 (Lord Rodger) (appeal taken from Eng. &
Wales C.A.).
246. Relying on an unstated presumption of what it means to be gay
effectively denies cultural differences.  As with gender, culture af-
fects the ways in which gay and lesbian communities form and in-
teract as well as the ways in which sexual orientation is individually
expressed . . . . Sexual orientation, like gender identity, is created
by and through culture, as opposed to having an essential core.
Sarah Hinger, Finding the Fundamental: Shaping Identity in Gender and Sexual
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First, by relying on external standards of reference of
“universal applicability,”247 the connection between Refugee
Convention grounds and international human rights law pro-
motes objective and consistent decision making.  This objec-
tive framework reduces the risk of conflicting decisions be-
tween, and indeed within, jurisdictions.  It also limits the scope
for decision makers to import their own subjective under-
standings of sexuality into their consideration of what might
fall within the protected interest of “sexual orientation.”248
Second, recourse to internationally agreed standards pro-
motes an interpretation of the Refugee Convention that is sen-
sitive to the reality that states can only be bound by what they
have agreed.  This is not only a matter of principle, but is also
“strategically wise”249 as judges are less likely to view an inter-
pretation grounded in accepted legal standards as inappropri-
ately activist or otherwise beyond their remit.250
Third, and perhaps most important, a commitment to in-
terpret the nexus grounds in line with non-discrimination and
related principles of international human rights law enables
the primary delimiting criterion of refugee law to evolve in a
contextually sensitive way.  Because non-discrimination law is
specifically designed to identify and respond to those forms of
disfranchisement agreed to be unacceptable by the interna-
tional community, it provides the perfect basis to give sub-
stance to the intention of the Convention’s drafters to limit
247. James C. Hathaway & Michelle Foster, Membership of a Particular Social
Group, INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 477, 482 (2003).
248. The same problem of subjectivity might also affect the way that coun-
sel frames a particular case. See Jain v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t,
[2000] EWCA (Civ) 3009, [3] (appeal taken from Immigr. Appeal Trib.)
(U.K.) (“More generally, there is, I suspect, in the basis on which the present
case has been argued before us an inbuilt assumption as to the extent to
which homosexuality and homosexual practices should be permitted in a
modern State.”).
249. James C. Hathaway, The Relationship Between Human Rights and Refugee
Law: What Refugee Judges Can Contribute, in INT’L ASSOC.N OF REFUGEE LAW
JUDGES, THE REALITIES OF REFUGEE DETERMINATION ON THE EVE OF A NEW
MILLENNIUM: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 85, 85(1998).
250. Sepet v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2001] EWCA (Civ) 681,
[66] (appeal taken from Immigr. Appeal Trib.) (U.K.) (“However wide the
canvas facing the judge’s brush, the image he makes has to be firmly based
on some conception of objective principle which is recognized as a legiti-
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refugee status to persons whose risk flows from forms of civil
or political status deemed fundamental.  By grounding inter-
pretation of both protected forms of civil or political status and
the activities inherent therein in international human rights
law, we enable the Convention to “be seen as a living instru-
ment in the sense that while its meaning does not change over
time, its application will.”251  Indeed, senior courts were per-
suaded to embrace sexual orientation as a form of “particular
social group” precisely on the grounds of the consonance of
that characterization with contemporary understandings of
non-discrimination law.252
Our concern with the decisions in S395 and HJ and HT is
not the adoption of a very vigorous (and yes, liberating) view
of behavior understood to fall within the protected interest of
“sexual orientation.”  Rather it is that the Australian and
United Kingdom courts did so without providing any princi-
pled basis for their departure from the accepted position that
the Refugee Convention’s nexus grounds are to be conceived
in line with non-discrimination principles.  By suggesting that
a boundless range of activities is protected under the rubric of
sexual orientation, the courts have created a schism between
the understanding of nexus adopted in cases based on a claim-
ant’s religion or political opinion (where protected activities
are circumscribed by reference to evolving norms of interna-
tional non-discrimination law), and cases based on a claim-
ant’s sexual orientation (where there is to be, it seems, no
principled circumscription).  There may be some good reason
for differentiating between these categories—for example,
that sexual orientation is more like the truly innate and un-
changeable characteristics of race and nationality than like re-
ligion or political opinion, which are immutable only in the
sense that disassociation imposes an unacceptable human
rights cost.  But if this (or some other) justification was in fact
251. Id. [6] (Lord Bingham).  This conceptualization of the Convention
mirrors the teleological approach taken by the International Court of Jus-
tice. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Af-
rica in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Reso-
lution 276, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 31 (June 21); Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case
(Greece v. Turk.) 1978 I.C.J. 3, 32 (Dec. 19).  The European Court of
Human Rights has also taken a similar approach.  Goodwin v. United King-
dom, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 18, ¶ 74 (2002).
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relied on by the courts, they had a responsibility to articulate
it.
In practice, the decisions in S395 and HJ and HT are far-
reaching.  In the first decision to consider HJ and HT, for ex-
ample, the English Court of Appeal noted that “[p]lainly the
ratio of [HJ and HT] is not limited just to sexual orientation
cases but will apply to all grounds covered by the Conven-
tion.”253  There has however been considerable concern and
confusion surrounding the judgment’s unqualified vision of
protected activities.  In the case of TM, handed down less than
a month after HJ and HT, Justice Elias expressed his concern
about the “far-reaching” language of HJ and HT, and made an
attempt to employ international human rights standards to
draw a line between protected and unprotected activity in the
context of a political opinion case, observing that “if the pro-
posed action is at the margins, persistence in the activity in the
face of the threatened harm is not a situation of being perse-
cuted and does not attract protection.”254  Yet less than four
months later, in another political opinion case, the same court
seemed to reject the suggestion that there might be limits on
protected activities, observing that “[Lord Rodger’s] com-
ments on what was involved in the right of a gay man to live
‘freely and openly,’ make it hard to see where he would have
drawn the line between ‘core’ and ‘marginal’ actions or activi-
ties.”255  More recently still, the English High Court suggested
that the decision in HJ and HT “does not of course mean that
the punishment of any form of sexual behaviour or of any
manner of expressing religious or other opinions” is pro-
tected.256
While on the surface having generated a legal muddle, it
is at least possible that this confusion was explicitly sown by the
courts (or at least, by the United Kingdom Supreme Court).
Was the goal perhaps to encourage lower courts to jettison the
previously accepted link between the nexus clause and inter-
253. TM (Zim.) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2010] EWCA (Civ)
916, [38] (appeal taken from Asylum & Immigr. Trib.) (U.K.).
254. Id. [40].
255. RT (Zim.) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2010] EWCA (Civ)
1285, [32], [2011] Imm. A.R. 259 (appeal taken from Asylum & Immigr.
Trib.) (U.K.).
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national non-discrimination norms in favor of a more liberta-
rian understanding of equality?  There are, indeed, principled
grounds to argue for an understanding of non-discrimination
law not grounded in the protection of immutable characteris-
tics, but which instead celebrates and protects difference (pre-
sumably subject to the duty not to infringe the rights of
others).  In this regard, Lord Rodger’s stirring liberation mani-
festo echoes Kenji Yoshino’s argument that the focus of non-
discrimination law on the protection of immutable identity is
unnecessarily cribbed, that we should instead embrace an “ac-
commodation model” under which demands for conformity
are countenanced only if those arguing for the same bear the
burden of proof in what he terms a “reason-forcing conversa-
tion.”257
However, if the Australian and British courts intended to
unleash such a fundamental challenge to non-discrimination
law grounded in immutability258 or, indeed, if they wished to
encourage a divorce of the nexus clause from non-discrimina-
tion law altogether, ought not their position have been made
clear, and expressly justified?  And if they did not intend to
launch such a radical transformation, but simply to establish a
sui generis rule for gay claimants, shouldn’t that position have
been forthrightly stated, and the risks of such a conceptual
schism addressed?
257. KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING 178–81 (2006).
258. It is important to recall, as Yoshino forthrightly acknowledges, that
there is no sign that law is likely to shift away from its present focus on the
protection of immutable identity, the strength of principled arguments
favoring such a shift notwithstanding:
But now I must temper passion with realism.  I believe we should
adopt a group-based accommodation model to protect traditional
civil rights groups from covering demands.  I believe with equal
conviction, however, that courts are unlikely to adopt this course.
The explosive pluralism of contemporary American society will in-
exorably push this country away from group-based politics—there
will be too many groups to keep track of, much less to protect.  In-
deed, I expect English jurisprudence to look more like American
jurisprudence fifty years from now than vice versa.  Americans are







      03/19/2012   11:22:47
31420-nyi_44-2 Sheet No. 41 Side A      03/19/2012   11:22:47
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYI\44-2\NYI202.txt unknown Seq: 73  8-MAR-12 9:05
2012] QUEER CASES MAKE BAD LAW 387
CONCLUSION
“Hard cases, it has frequently been observed, are apt to
introduce bad law.”259  In formulating what has become a legal
adage, Judge Rolfe expressed his concern that the faithful ap-
plication of legal rules—in that case, rules on privity of con-
tract—would require him to deny relief to a deserving litigant,
an injured coachman who had no direct contractual relation-
ship with the negligent repair firm.
The circumstances of S395 and HJ and HT are, of course,
quite different.  Despite what we view as the courts’ misapplica-
tion of the “well-founded fear” test, failure accurately to iden-
tify the relevant risk of being persecuted, and disregard of the
principled limits set by the refugee definition’s nexus require-
ment, the courts ultimately ruled in favor of granting asylum
to the applicants.  As such—and in stark contrast to the dis-
abled coachman of concern to Judge Rolfe who would receive
no relief—the misapplication of legal rules in S395 and HJ and
HT meant that gay men seeking relief from the misery of a life
of perpetual enforced concealment in Bangladesh, Cameroon,
and Iran would be able “to live freely and openly . . . to be as
free as their straight equivalents . . . to live their lives in the way
that is natural to them as gay men, without fear of persecu-
tion.”
In the face of such a clearly correct result, we may appear
churlish to insist that the basis for recognition of refugee sta-
tus in such cases be revisited.  We wish to be absolutely clear
that, like nearly everyone else in the human rights community,
we deeply admire both the Australian and British courts’ rejec-
tion of a “duty of discretion” to avert persecution, and more
generally their commitment to the context-sensitive applica-
tion of refugee law to gay applicants.
But it would in our view be a serious error to allow our
instincts simply to celebrate the cases to override our intellec-
tual responsibility to ensure that refugee law evolves in a way
that is both principled and sustainable.  While there is no
question that S395 and HJ and HT are watershed decisions,
Oliver Wendell Holmes famously cautioned that “[g]reat cases
like hard cases make bad law. For great cases are called great,
259. Winterbottom v. Wright, (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Exch.) 406; 10
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not by reason of their importance . . . but because of some
accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to
the feelings and distorts the judgment.”260
As we have been at pains to show, the courts’ errors are
not without real and detrimental consequences, both for gay
claimants (at least in the medium term) and for persons seek-
ing refugee status on the basis of other Convention grounds
(as decisions have already shown).  Most important, the cor-
rection of these errors in line with the framework advocated
here will in no sense compromise the ability of gay applicants
and others to access asylum when faced with the prospect of
indefinite self-repression to avert clear threats to their safety.
No, there is no well-founded fear of exogenous harms,
such as prosecution or beatings, where a gay man would in fact
opt for seclusion to escape such threats.  But, given the trau-
matic effects that normally follow from self-repression (anxi-
ety, paranoia, disassociation, or worse) there is an alternative
and solid basis, grounded in the traditional link between per-
secution and risk to core norms of human rights law, to affirm
refugee status.  Because the risk of severe psychological harm
has been authoritatively interpreted to contravene the right to
protection against cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment,
this is the persecutory risk that is most likely to be well-
founded in such cases.
And no, it is not the case that refugee status is owed when-
ever serious harm is threatened by reason only of an applicant
having engaged in some activity that is vaguely or stereotypi-
cally associated with homosexuality (or any other protected
ground).  Drawing on norms of non-discrimination law, the
“for reasons of” criterion in the Convention definition was
conceived as a principled delimitation of the beneficiary class.
This means that it is ordinarily a form of immutable identity—
whether actual or imputed—that is the lynchpin to refugee
status. In general terms, refugee status is owed only where risk
ensues because of who the applicant is or what he believes.
Where risk is the product not of identity per se but rather of
having engaged in a particular activity, the nexus requirement
can still be met.  But this is so only when the activity engender-
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ing the risk is fairly deemed to be intrinsic to the protected
identity.
Refugee law is not an all-embracing remedy for every cir-
cumstance in which full freedom is not made available.  This
realization should not, however, blind us to the dominant real-
ity: refugee law fairly interpreted may be imperfect, but is
nonetheless a powerful means by which human rights commit-
ments can be made real in the lives of those fundamentally
disfranchised in their home states.  It is a sign of strength that
refugee law encompasses not just gay applicants facing the
clear risk of prosecution under anti-gay laws or rabid vigilante
violence, but also persons who would opt for the prisoner’s
dilemma of sacrificing their own psychological well-being to
avert such harms.  Similarly, the commitment of refugee law to
deny states the right to circumscribe the beneficiary class on
any basis other than by reference to principles of non-discrimi-
nation law, including both forms of fundamental identity and
engagement in activities at the core of such protected identi-
ties, is a critical bulwark against self-interested retrogression.
We will, however, occasionally have to acknowledge that
some persons whose aspirations for freedom pull at our heart-
strings may not be able to meet even these progressively inter-
preted tests.  Law is imperfect, and international law—subject
to the need to secure the consent of an extraordinarily diverse
community of states—is perhaps more imperfect than most
law.  It is nonetheless clear that the context-sensitive applica-
tion of norms already agreed by states can yield powerful re-
sults, including the liberation of sexual minorities from ongo-
ing self-repression.
